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ARTICLES
When Justice Fails: Indemnification for
Unjust Conviction
ADELE BERNHARDt
In thirty-six states in our nation, people who have been convicted and incar-
cerated for crimes they did not commit are precluded from recovering damages
in a court of law by the inflexibility of tort law and civil rights doctrine--despite
later exoneration.1 In those jurisdictions, indemnification legislation should be
enacted. The necessary law is simple, clear and effective. The remedy is not ex-
pensive and does not require creation of new bureaucratic agencies. Indeed, in-
demnification legislation has been tested over time in more than a dozen states
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University. I want to thank my husband, Peter Neufeld, who, with his friend and collaborator,
Barry Scheck, founded the Innocence Project at Cardozo Law School. Their work together has
helped to free, at last count, 44 unjustly convicted men. I decided to write this article when I
discovered that many of them would not be indemnified for their years spent in prison. Much
appreciation to my friends at Pace Law School, Vanessa Merton and Lissa Griffin, for their
suggestions and encouragement, to Iris Mercado for her skilled manuscript preparation, and to
George Galgano, Stephen Riccardulli and Maureen Shea for their research assistance.
1. The following states have an indemnification statute. See Cal Penal Code § 4900-4906
(1982) (enacted 1941) (California); Ill Rev Stat Ch 705, § 505/8 (1992) (enacted 1945) (Illinois);
Iowa Code Ann § 663A.1 (West 1998) (enacted 1997) (Iowa); 14 Me Rev Stat Ann § 8241 (1998)
(enacted 1993) (Maine); Md Code 1957 art 78(a) § 16(A) (1998) (enacted 1963) (Maryland); NH
Rev Stat Ann § 541-B:14 (1998) (enacted 1977) (New Hampshire); NJ Stat Ann %§ 52:4C-1-4C-6
(\Vest 1999) (New Jersey); NY Ct Claims Act § 8-b (1989) (enacted 1984); NC Gen Stat 5 148-
82 (1998) (enacted 1947) (North Carolina); Ohio Rev Code Ann § 2305.02, 2743.48 (enacted
1986) (Ohio);Tenn Code Ann § 9-8-108 (a)(7)(1998) (enacted 1955) (Tennessee); Tex Rev Civ
Stat Ann § 103.001 (Vernon 1997) (enacted 1965) (Texas); W Va Code § 14-2-13(a)(1998) (en-
acted 1987) (West Virginia); and Wis Stat § 775.05 (1993) (enacted 1943) (Wisconsin). There is
also a Federal compensation statute. See 28 USC § 1495, 2513 (1998) (enacted 1948); DC
1221-1225 (1998) (enacted 1981) (District of Columbia).
2. In many of the states having indemnification statutes, existing codes need revision to
expunge archaic restrictions and to increase potential awards. See section IV.
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Most importantly, a legislative remedy is the only reliable and fair response to the
inevitable mistakes that occur as a byproduct of the operation of a criminal jus-
tice system as large as ours.3 The state whose actions have put individuals in
prison for crimes they did not commit owes a debt to those who through no
fault of their own have lost years and opportunity. The debt should be recog-
nized and paid.
Although scholars have been urging the passage of such legislation, with little
success, for at least sixty years, progress should proceed more rapidly now. Until
recently, the assertion that innocent people are routinely and frequently con-
victed was supported only by anecdotal witness interviews and historical re-
search. 4 Critics debated the validity of methodology, inferences and conclusions.5
Today recent developments in the forensic sciences-particularly in DNA profil-
ing-prove, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that mistakes occur and that the inno-
cent are convicted everywhere, in sizable numbers, sometimes as a result of neg-
ligence and other times simply by accident, mistake or serendipity.6 Certainty
compels action.
The first section of this article reviews the evidence, both historical and con-
temporary, documenting the existence and frequency of wrongful convictions.
The next dissects an actual case to illustrate how an innocent person can be con-
victed and why, once the error has been corrected and the conviction is vacated,
that person generally has no legal action for damages in the absence of indemni-
fication legislation. The third section argues that society has a moral obligation to
assist the wrongfully convicted; that indemnification legislation is a better ap-
proach than reliance on "moral obligation" bills; and that enacting legislation is
possible-just as it was possible to pass victims' compensation laws in every
state. The fourth part compares various indemnification statutes to urge that
antiquated restrictions be lifted and that potential awards be increased.
3. On June 30, 1998, 1,277,866 prisoners were under federal or state jurisdiction. See US
Dept of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, http://ww-v.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/prisons.htm (Aug 3,
1998).
4. See Edwin M. Borchard, Convicting the Innocent: Errors of Criminal Justice, (1932) [hereinafter
Convicting The Innocent] Judge Jerome Frank and Barbara Frank, Not Guily, (Doubleday 1957)
[hereinafter Not Guilty]; Michael L. Radelet, In Spite Of Innocence: Erroneous Convictions in Capital
Cases, (1992) [hereinafter In Spite Of Innocence].
5. See Stephen J. Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: A Response to the Bedau-
Radelet Study, 41 Stan L Rev 121 (1988). Markman and Cassell contend that Radelet and Bedau
fail to mount convincing proof that all 400 stories contained in their treatise describe truly inno-
cent individuals. They quarrel with the quantum of proof in some cases, the sources and the
standard used in others. Radelet and Bedau respond to the critique in Michael L. Radelet and
Hugo Adam Bedau, The Myth of Infallibilioy : A Reply to Markman and Cassell, 41 Stan L Rev 161
(1988).
6. See Edward Conners, et al, Convicted By Juries, Exonerated ly Science: Case Studies in the use of
DNA evidence to Establish Innocence after Trial, US Dept of Justice, National Institute of Justice
(1986) [hereinafter NIJ or NIJ Report].
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I. PROOF THAT THE INNOCENT ARE CONVICTED
In June of 1996, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) published a report
documenting twenty-eight wrongful convictions for sexual assault and murder.
The cases were tried in fourteen state courts and the District of Columbia be-
tween 1979 and 1991. The convicted men served an average of almost seven
years before being released from prison.
The NIJ report is significant for a number of reasons. First, it presents irrefu-
table proof that innocent people are convicted. Second, the study is a powerful
indictment of the reliability of eyewitness identification, especially when identifi-
cation procedures are police-arranged. Third, it provides some basis for estimat-
ing the frequency of wrongful convictions. Fourth, it highlights the importance
of collecting and preserving crime scene evidence. Finally it illustrates the inabil-
ity of the direct appeal process to correct factual errors.
Advocates were able to establish the innocence of the wrongly convicted men
whose stories are collected in the NIJ report because in each case the perpetrator
had left biological evidence (usually semen) at the scene of the crime, which was
collected (from underwear or bodies) and preserved post-conviction so that it
was available to be compared to the convicted persons' DNA later on. In each,
post-conviction DNA comparison proved to a scientific certainty that the con-
victed persons were not guilty, even though in twenty-two of the twenty-eight
cases the convictions had been affirmed by appellate courts.
Importantly, in twenty-three of the twenty-eight cases, the accused men were
positively-but incorrectly-identified by the victims as the perpetrators of the
crimes. Since there is no reason to assume that eyewitnesses perceive, recall or
testify more accurately in cases other than sexual assaults, it is safe to assume that
eyewitness mistakes occur in all kinds of cases at about the same frequency. Be-
cause eyewitness testimony is the key evidence in many criminal prosecutions,
some percentage of all convictions based on eyewitness testimony are wrong.
Every year since 1989, in about 25 percent of the sexual assault cases referred
to the FBI... [pre-trial during the investigation of a criminal case], where re-
sults could be obtained.. the primary suspect has been excluded by forensic
DNA testing. Specifically, FBI officials report that out of roughly 10,000 sexual
assault cases since 1989, about 2,000 tests have been inconclusive (usually insuf-
ficient high molecular weight DNA to do testing), about two thousand have ex-
cluded the primary suspect and about six thousand have included or "matched"
the primary suspect.8
In other words, in the last seven years, one in four primary suspects in sexual
assault cases, whose blood was forwarded to the FBI for testing, have been ex-
cluded. Although it is impossible to know for certain whether this 25 percent
7. See id.
8. Quoted from "Commentary by Peter Neufeld, Esq. and Barry Scheck," of the Innocence
Project, contained in the NIJ Report at xxviil
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would have been convicted after trial without the DNA testing, the odds of a
wrongful conviction in those cases seem fairly high.9
What the NIJ report conclusively proves, scholars have been arguing for
years. 10 In 1932, Edwin M. Borchard published Convicting the Innocent-a collec-
tion of sixty-five criminal prosecutions of people Borchard believed to be "com-
pletely innocent"--advocating the passage of indemnification legislation." In
action-packed sketches filled with details of life in the early part of the 20th cen-
tury, Borchard tells the stories of farmers, taxi-drivers, "literary loafers" as well as
drunks and ne'er-do-wells--all wrongfully convicted. They were convicted in
federal and state courts, in rural areas and in big cities, by judges and by juries.
Borchard's portraits convince us that anyone could be both wrongly accused and
unable to prove innocence.
Borchard attributed the erroneous convictions to a variety of errors, including-
mistaken eyewitness identification; witness perjury; the damaging effect of a pre-
vious criminal conviction; the use of unreliable coerced confessions; irresponsi-
ble "expert" testimony; and poverty of the accused preventing the mounting of
an adequate defense.12 Although he made suggestions for improvements in the
administration of the criminal justice system to reduce the occurrence of error, it
is impossible to read these compelling tales without concluding that errors can-
not be entirely eliminated from the process of criminal adjudication and that
mistakes will inevitably occur. Ultimately, serendipity was responsible for many
of the false convictions and serendipity accounted for the discovery of many of
the mistakes.
Take, for example, the case of J. B. Brown who was convicted and sentenced
to hang for the murder of a railroad worker, Harry E. Wesson. 13 Mr. Wesson's
body was discovered as it lay in the shop yard of the Florida Southern Railway,
in the early morning hours of October 17, 1901. Mr. Wesson had been shot in
the head at point blank range. There were no witnesses, the weapon was never
recovered, and there were a number of equally likely suspects. The criminal in-
vestigation focused on J.B. Brown when it was imagined that he had been previ-
ously fired from the railroad and that information provided by Wesson had con-
tributed to the dismissal. Although there was no direct evidence linking J.B.
Brown to the murder, and although he steadfastly maintained his innocence, bits
of circumstantial evidence combined with perjured testimony supplied by cell-
mates convinced harried police, under pressure to solve the crime, to indict Mr.
9. Even assuming, conservatively, half the normal conviction rate (and state conviction
rates for felony sexual assault cases average about 62 percent), hundreds of people, who have
been exonerated by FBI DNA testing, would have otherwise been convicted. Commentary by
Neufeld & Scheck, at xxix (cited in note 8).
10. The NIJ report takes no position on what should be done to compensate those who have
been wrongly convicted or to reform the criminal justice system--other than Attorney General
Janet Reno's introductory message which exhorts the scientific community to create standards
for the collection and preservation of DNA evidence. See NIJ Report at iii.
11. See Conicting The Innocent, (cited in note 4)
12. See id at xiii-xxiv.
13. See id at 33-39.
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Brown and later persuaded jurors to convict him. Borchard reports that a "spe-
cially built gallows" was constructed for the hanging. "Brown was lead to the
gallows, and the rope adjusted about his neck."14 But before the trap door could
open, the warrant of execution was read aloud to those present. Somehow
names had been transposed and the formal document ordered the execution of
the foreman of the jury that had sentenced Brown to death. Brown's life was
saved and his death sentence commuted to life in prison, so that when the real
killer confessed twelve years later, Brown was still alive to be released from
prison as an elderly and disabled man. Sixteen years after his release, the Florida
Legislature decided to award Mr. Brown $2,492 as compensation for the years he
spent in prison.
Not content to rely on sympathy to motivate the public to enact indemnifica-
tion legislation, Borchard appealed to national pride as well. Many of the Euro-
pean and South American countries had already enacted efficient and fair in-
demnification plans,15 in stark contrast to the United States where, by 1932, only
California16, North Dakota 7 and Wisconsin 8 had indemnification statutes.
Borchard no doubt anticipated that within a few short years of his book's pub-
lication, states across the country would enact the legislation he favored. He was
wrong. Sixty-six years later, in 1998, only fourteen states, the District of Colum-
bia and the federal government have such statutes 9
Although his goal was not achieved, Borchard's work was not forgotten. In
fact, his themes were reiterated and his writing style emulated. Twenty-five years
after the publication of Convicting the Innocent, Jerome Frank, a judge of the United
States Court of Appeals in the Second Circuit and advisor to Franklin D. Roose-
velt, and his daughter Barbara, similarly described the fate of an entirely different
set of individuals---also wrongfully convicted.20
The Franks spend more time than did Borchard struggling to account for the
errors that caused the erroneous convictions and to devise solutions to prevent
recurrence. They expose the dangers of prosecutorial failure to turn over excul-
patory material to the defense and the pernicious effects of the prosecutorial
tendency to indict lying witnesses for perjury more frequently when the accused
is acquitted than where the witness's lies have caused a wrongful conviction.
They articulate the dangers of the police tendency to "rush to judgement":
See what sometimes happens: A bank has been robbed, its cashier murdered. A
bystander reports to the police that he saw William Jones commit the murder.
Having thus found a suspect, the police sedulously run down all dues that seem
to incriminate William Jones. They piece together these clues and jump to the
14. See id at 37.
15. See id at 385-387.
16. See 1913 Cal Stat ch 165, p 245 (current version at Cal Pen Code 5§ 4900-4906 (1941)).
17. See 1917 ND Laws Ch 172, p 1519 (repealed 1965).
18. See 1913 Wis Stat Ch 189 (current version at Wis Stat
§ 775.05 (1943)).
19. See note 1 (current list of indemnification statutes).
20. See Not Guily (cited in note 4). Barbara Frank completed Not Guily after her father's
death and published it posthumously.
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conclusion that he is their man. They overlook other clues that might exculpate
Jones or inculpate someone else. They brush aside facts inconsistent with their
theory of Jones's guilt. In this they are not dishonest. For here pride and preju-
dice operate: Pride in their theory is buttressed by prejudice against any other.2
Almost two generations later, in 1992, Michael L. Radelet, Hugo Adam Bedau,
and Constance E. Putnam, in the documentary style shared by Borchard and the
Franks, describe four hundred cases of wrongful convictions, including a stag-
gering twenty-three cases of wrongful execution.22 Convinced that changes in the
criminal justice system will not eliminate miscarriages of justice, the authors
spend little time discussing potential improvements. "Most errors caught in time
are corrected not thanks to the system, but in spite of the system."' 3 The au-
thors, like the Franks forty years earlier, press fervently for abolition of the death
penalty, marshaling evidence to illustrate that the United States is routinely con-
victing, and occasionally executing, entirely innocent persons in the name of
justice.
Although the dramatic and emotional stories failed to abolish the death pen-
alty or to widely enact indemnification legislation, the literature convinced law-
yers, writers and sociologists interested in the criminal justice system that erro-
neous convictions occur; involved scholars in debates over why they occurred;
and prompted interest in remedies.2 4
21. Id at 66.
22. See In Spite of Innocence, at 8 n7 (cited in note 4).
23. Id at 278.
24. Four other books in English have been published on the subject of wrongful convictions.
See Ruth Brandon & Christie Davies, Wrongful Imprsonment: Mistaken Convictions and Their Conse-
quences(Archon 1973); Earl Stanley Gardner, The Court of Last Resot(1952); Edward Radin, The
Innocents, (1964); Martin Yant, Presumed Guilty: When Innocent People are Wrongy Convicted (Prome-
theus 1991). Numerous articles focus on causes of wrongful convictions. See, for example,
Bennet L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U Pitt L Rev 393, 451-54 (1992) (examples of
prosecutorial misconduct resulting in miscarriages of justice); Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Ac-
quittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliaby Acquit the Innocent, 49 Rutgers L Rev 1317 (1997)
[hereinafter Meaningless Acquittals]; Samual R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions
are Common in Capital Cases, 44 Buff L Rev 469 (1996); James McCloskey, Convicting the Innocent,
Crim Just Ethics 2 (Winter/Spring 1989) (James McCloskey is the Director of the Centurion
Ministries, Inc. of Princeton New Jersey, which has successfully won freedom for dozens of
innocent and unjustly convicted individuals across the country); Marty I. Rosenbaum, Inevitable
Error- Wrongful New York State Homicide Convictions 1965-1988, 18 NYU Rev L & Social Change
807 (1991) (reporting results of a study conducted by the New York State Defender's Associa-
tion of wrongful convictions in New York); Steven Wisotsky, Miscarriages of Justice: Their Causes
and Cures, 9 St Thomas L Rev 547 (1997). Most recently Jack King, The Ordeal of Guy PaullMorin:
Canada Copes with Systemic Injustice, The Champion, 8 (August 1988). Still others focus on com-
pensation for the wrongly convicted. See, for example, James Cleary, When the Prisoner is Innocent,
14 Hum Rts 42 (Spring 1987) (a brief overview of existing wrongful compensation statutes, their
benefits, and their deficiencies); Richard C. Donnelly, Unconvicting the Innocent, 6 Vand L Rev 20
(1952) (barriers to establishing innocence); Joseph H. King, Jr., Compensation of Persons Erroneousy
Confined by the State, 118 U Pa L Rev 1091 (1970) (the author supports compensation for those
who have been erroneously convicted or civilly confined and discusses possible legal theories
[6:73
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Even prior to publication of the NIJ report, sociologists were beginning to ac-
cept the premise that wrongful convictions happen and to calculate frequency, 5
Huff, Rattner and Sagarin surveyed participants in the Ohio criminal justice sys-
tem-judges, prosecutors, public defenders, sheriffs, chiefs of police, and state
attorneys general, and asked each to estimate how often they believe that wrong-
ful convictions happen 26 Respondents estimated that 99.5 percent of all guilty
verdicts in felony cases are correct. As the authors point out, if those beliefs are
true, juries return a high number of unreliable verdicts every year. Assuming that
70 percent of people charged with felony crimes are convicted 7 and that 99.5
percent of the convictions are correct, Huff, Rattner and Sagarin conclude that
in 1993, when 2,848,400 people were arrested, 10,000 people were erroneously
convicted 28
The Huff, Rattner and Sagarin numbers-high as they seem-probably un-
derestimate the number of erroneous convictions. "These figures represent con-
victions of innocent people following trial."29 Many more innocent people may
enter pleas of guilty when confronted with the risk of conviction after a sentence
and the potential of a longer sentence.3 For example, David Vasquez, whose
story is included in the NIJ report, pleaded guilty to second-degree homicide and
burglary in order to avoid the possibility of the death sentence after tria.31 The
police claimed that Mr. Vasquez, who is mentally disabled, had made inculpatory
statements during a police interrogation. Post-conviction DNA tests proved that
another individual had committed the murder. Mr. Vasquez was released and
pardoned.32
The N-J report confirmed what many participants in the criminal justice sys-
tem already believed-that people are wrongfully convicted. The work of Bor-
chard, the Franks, Radelet and Bedau-carefully reconstructing trials, describing
upon which damage awards could be predicated); and David S. Kasdan, A Uniform Approach to
New York State Liabiit for Wrongf Imprisonment:A Statutory Model, 49 Albany L Rev 201 (1985).
25. C. Ronald Huff, et al, Convicted but Innocent: Wrongful Convictions and Public Poliy 59 (Sage
1996), [hereinafter Convicted But Innocent].
26. Huff, et al chose Ohio for their survey because it was the seventh most populous state,
contained a mix of urban, rural and suburban areas, and has a fairly representative criminal
justice system. Convicted But Innocent at 57-59. According to the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports,
the state has an average rate of felonies, and its prisons have commitment rates similar to those
of prisons in other large states. Convicted But Innocent at 58. Additionally two celebrated cases of
wrongful conviction and later exoneration occurred in Ohio. Huff mentions, without a citation,
the case of William Jackson who was exonerated after five years in jail and that of Bradley Char-
les Cox, reported in Cox v State of Ohio, 552 NE 2d 970 (Ct Claims Ohio 1988).
27. Bureau of Justice Statistics, US Dept of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 497
(1995). Ninety-two percent of convictions occurring within one year of arrest were obtained
through a guilty plea, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/cases.htm (Oct 24, 1998).
28. See Convicted But Innocent, at 374 (cited in note 25).
29. Daniel Givelber, MeaninglessAcquittals, at 1343 (cited in note 24).
30. Id.
31. In some circumstances a defendant will be permitted to plead guilty without admitting
the facts of the crime. See, for example, North Carolna vA 'ord, 400 US 25 (1970). See especially
note 164 and the accompanying text.
32. See NIJ at 75-76 (cited in note 6).
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the community and the characters involved; highlighting the bizarre twists of fate
which resulted in the many erroneous convictions and subsequent exonera-
tions-prepared the public to accept the NIJ conclusions. The early studies kept
interest in the issue of wrongful convictions alive, even as the courts grew less
concerned with innocence.33 They questioned whether police procedures, sanc-
tioned as consistent with due process, were effectively distinguishing between
guilty and innocent suspects. They suggested that the factors which contribute to
wrongful convictions tend to be mistakes of fact (such as mistaken eyewitness
identification, incorrect police hypothesis or careless police work, witness per-
jury, and false confessions), rather than errors applying the law and, as a result,
improvements in criminal procedure laws and police investigatory techniques
will at best reduce the frequency of wrongful convictions, not eliminate them
altogether.34 Finally, they reminded the public of its moral responsibility to those
who have been wrongfully convicted.
Undoubtedly the powerful confirmation of DNA profiling will stimulate re-
newed interest in improving the criminal justice system's ability to convict the
guilty and free the innocent.35 It should also silence skeptics who might insist
that the innocent are never convicted and rededicate us to achieving Borchard's
goal-indemnification for those who have been wrongfully convicted.
Even though he was innocent, Marion Coakley was convicted of rape and
robbery in 1984. As post-conviction serological testing would later prove, the
verdict was incorrect. Mr. Coakley was not the perpetrator. The factors which
Borchard, the Franks and Radelet and Bedau indict as consistently contributing
to wrongful convictions-mistaken eyewitness identification, narrowly focused
police investigation, prosecutorial failure to disclose exculpatory information-
converged in this case. A close look at the crime, the police investigation, and the
trial illustrates concretely how an innocent person can be found guilty, why the
errors that lead to conviction will recur in other prosecutions, and why such a
person would have no remedy for the harm suffered in the absence of an in-
demnification statute.
33. According to the Supreme Court, claims of actual innocence are an insufficient ground
upon which to base a claim for federal habeas relief. A claim of innocence, unaccompanied by a
claim of constitutional trial error, must be so compelling as to make a sentence of execution
"constitutionally intolerable," Scblup v Delo, 513 US 298, 317 (1995).
34. See In Spite Of Innocence at 287 (cited in note 25).
35. See generally, Meaningless Acquittals, (cited in note 24).
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II. THE INADEQUACY OF EXISTING REMEDIES IN TORT AND CIVIL
RIGHTS LAW FOR THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN WRONGLY
CONVICTED AND LATER EXONERATED
A. A CASE STUDY: THE PEOPLE V MARION COAKLEY3 6
1. The Crime
On October 13, 1983, Olga Delgado and Gabriel Vargas spent the night at the
Bronx Park Motel in New York City. In the early morning hours a stranger
broke into their room asking for money. The robber locked Mr. Vargas in a
closet and raped Ms. Delgado. Still unsatisfied, the stranger demanded more
money, and Ms. Delgado proposed driving him to her home where she promised
cash could be found. The stranger took the bait and drove Ms. Delgado to her
apartment complex. When he saw the silhouette of someone else, Ms. Delgado's
brother-in-law, Jose Rios, at the apartment door, the rapist fled, abandoning the
car near the Bronx Park Motel.
2. The Investigation
The police were called. The car was discovered and dusted for prints. Ms.
Delgado, Mr. Vargas and Mr. Rios each independently described the perpetrator
as a black male with a dark complexion, about 26-28 years old, 5 feet 7 inches
tall, weighing about 150-160 pounds, with a mustache, a "beard" or "stubble" of
chin hair and a short "afro" haircut Later that night, while Ms. Delgado was
taken to Jacobi Hospital where a rape kit was prepared, Mr. Rios and Mr. Vargas
were taken to the photo room of the police precinct to look through photo trays.
They were told to go directly to one of the officers with any photograph either
one of them recognized and not to show it to each other. Nonetheless, when
Rios saw Marion Coaldey's photograph, he took it over to Vargas and said, "This
is the man." Vargas agreed. When Ms. Delgado arrived at the station house from
the hospital, she was shown a photo-array from which she, too, selected Mr.
Coaldey. The record does not reflect what the police may have said to any of the
witnesses, nor what either of the witnesses may have said to Mrs. Delgado as she
viewed the various photographs.
Marion Coaldey was arrested two days later and positively identified in a line-
up viewed by Mr. Vargas, Mr. Rios and Ms. Delgado. Mr. Coakley is black, but
not dark complexioned. He does not have a Jamaican accent, and on the day of
36. Coakly v State of New York, 571 NYS 2d 867 (NY Ct C1 1991), a f'd, 640 NYS 2d 500
(NYAD 1 Dept 1996) (determining state's liability for the previously determined wrongful con-
viction under New York State's Court of Claims Act § 8-b). See section IV of this article. (dis-
cussing § 8-b in detail). I am famili with the case because Peter Neufeld and Barry Scheck
represented Marion Coadey, post-conviction. I participated in drafting Mr. Coadey's Appellate
Division brief responding to New York State's appeal from the favorable Court of Claims deci-
sion.
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his arrest did not have an Afro, long or short. He is mildly retarded. He was 28
years old at the time, and had been working at various part and full-time posi-
tions while living in the Bronx with his sister. The police had a copy of his pho-
tograph because Mr. Coakley had been arrested previously.
3. The Defense and the Trial
From the day of his arrest, Marion Coakley protested his innocence. He main-
tained always that he had been at a bible study meeting at the time of the crime,
and he immediately produced eight alibi witnesses. All eight witnesses were in-
terviewed by the prosecutor's office within days of the arrest. Significantly, Mar-
ion Coakley also demanded, took, and passed a polygraph test?7 At trial, the jury
was forced to resolve a difficult dilemma-eyewitnesses against alibi witnesses.
The jury convicted him. Mr. Coakley was sentenced to prison for an indetermi-
nate term of from five to fifteen years.
4. Post-Conviction
For many wrongfully convicted persons the story ends at sentencing. Marion
Coakley was lucky. Twenty-five months later, post-conviction counsel turned up
enough "newly discovered" evidence to convince the court to set aside the con-
viction38 and the Office of the District Attorney of Bronx County to dismiss the
indictment in the interest of justice.39
B. FACTUAL MISTAKES AND LEGAL ERRORS IN THE COAKLEY TRIAL
1. Mistaken Eyewitness Identification
Marion Coakley was convicted because three eyewitnesses incorrectly identi-
fied him as the perpetrator.40 In retrospect, the eyewitnesses' testimony, which
37. Even though the polygraph instrument and test have been refined and improved since
the District of Columbia Circuit Court held in Fye v United States, 293 F 1013 (DC Cir 1923),
that the results of polygraph examinations are inadmissible at trial because the technique was
not generally accepted in the relevant scientific community, most state courts still do not admit
polygraph evidence. Likewise, the Supreme Court, holding that the military's per se rule exclud-
ing polygraph evidence does not violate a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to pres-
ent a defense, stated that "there is simply no consensus that polygraph evidence is reliable."
United States v Scheffer, 523 US 303, at _, 118 S Ct 1261, 1265 (1998).
38. See NY Crim Proc Law § 4 4 0.10(g) (McKinney's Consolidated Laws of NY 1994).
39. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 5 220.10(i)(g) (McKinney Consolidated Law of N.Y. 1994).
40. Thirty years ago, in People v Wade, 388 US 218, 227 (1967), the Supreme Court noted that
mistaken identifications may have been responsible for more miscarriages of justice than any
other factor. Borchard attributes at least 29 erroneous convictions to mistaken eye-witness
identification. See Convicting the Innocent (cited note 3). Recent psychological studies have discov-
ered a great deal about eyewitness identification and about identification techniques. Many false
identifiers are highly sincere in their false identification and that in turn results in their being as
persuasive as eyewitnesses who have made accurate identifications. Gary L. Wells, et al, Accuray,
Confidence and Juror Perceptions in Eyewitness Identification, 64 J Applied Psychol 440 (1979). Re-
[6:73
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persuaded the jury to convict, seems particularly unreliable since each of the
witnesses had a limited opportunity to observe the perpetrator. From the mo-
ment he broke into the motel room, the stranger instructed his victims, at gun-
point, not to look at him. During much of the incident, Ms. Delgado was forced
to wear a bath-size towel over her face and head. Moreover, the only light in the
motel room emanated from the video image on the television screen. Conse-
quently, up until the time that the stranger and Ms. Delgado got into her car, Ms.
Delgado only saw the stranger's face "a couple of times."
While driving in the car, Ms. Delgado remembered looking at the man's face
in the reflection of the rear-view mirror, as he adjusted it, and being scared when
his eye caught hers. From that point on, throughout the entire drive to her
apartment, Ms. Delgado was too frightened to look at the stranger again.
Mr. Rios, who was the first to identify Mr. Coakley's photograph from the po-
lice trays, only glimpsed the stranger from behind the doorway of Ms. Vargas's
apartment. Mr. Vargas was locked in a closet for a good part of the incident.
2. Non-disclosure of Evidence Helpful to the Accused
Evidence which might have caused the jury to think more skeptically about
the strength of the eyewitnesses' testimony was not revealed to defense counsel.
Just four days after the crime, Mr. Vargas and Ms. Delgado hired an attorney to
initiate a lawsuit against the Bronx Park Motel. The $10 million suit was filed on
January 26, 1984, a year and a half before Mr. Coakley's criminal trial began.
When the criminal trial started, discovery in the civil suit was well under way, and
Ms. Delgado had been examined by a psychiatrist hired by the civil defendant.
The District Attorney's office and the police knew about the civil suit before and
during the trial, but nonetheless failed to disclose this to the defense.
When they testified against Mr. Coakley, Ms. Delgado and Mr. Vargas knew
that the motel management was claiming as a defense to their civil suit that no
rape or forced entry had ever occurred and that the whole incident was a pretext
to sue the motel Mr. Vargas and Ms. Delgado expressed concern in a private
conversation with the police, prior to their testifying at the criminal trial, that the
outcome of the criminal case might affect their civil suit. In short, the pending
$10 million civil suit provided Delgado and Vargas with what they perceived to
be a huge stake in the outcome of the criminal case. The jury never knew about
searchers have found that the human mind is so suggestive that memories can even be im-
planted. See generaljy, Elizabeth F. Loftus and James M. Doyle, Eyewitness Testimony: Civil and
Criminal 3d Edition 1997 referring particularly to Stephen J. Ceci and Maggie Bruck, Suggestiility
of the Child Witness: A Historical Review and Synthesis, 113 Psychol L Bull 403 (1993), and Luus,
C.A.E. & Wells, G.L. The Malleability of Eyewitness Confidence: Co-witness and Perseverance Ef-
feas, 79 J. Applied Psychol. 719-724 (1995). Beginning to doubt the reliability of eyewitness
testimony, federal courts have become more receptive to admitting expert testimony on the
subject of eyewitness identification. United States v Brien, 59 F3d 274 (1st Cir 1995), and United
States v Rincon, 28 F3d 921 (9th Cir 1994), where the First and Ninth Circuits, although affirming
lower court decisions excluding expert testimony, held that there might be occasions where such
testimony would be admissible.
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the interest these victims had in the outcome of the criminal prosecution, nor
could it weigh the effect such an interest would have had on the apparent cer-
tainty of their identification or their overall credibility as witnesses.41
Moreover, in a psychiatric evaluation conducted pursuant to her civil suit,
Delgado revealed that she had been seeing a psychiatrist prior to the rape-
robbery and that, as a result of the rape, she had experienced severe emotional
trauma and psychological shock. She was confined to her bed for three weeks
and to her home for four months. For the two years preceding trial and during
the trial itself, Delgado was being medicated due to her psychological problems.
Significantly, she revealed to the doctor that whenever she saw other blacks on
the street, she thought they looked just like the perpetrator.
The defense was never informed, and so the jury never learned, that another
witness, Edith Thompson, a chambermaid at the Bronx Park Motel, reported
seeing a person fitting the description of the perpetrator and failed to select Mr.
Coakley's photograph out of an array that was shown to her the night of the
crime. Ms. Vargas and Mr. Delgado are light-skinned Hispanics and the perpetra-
tor they described was a dark-skinned black. Edith Thompson, on the other
hand, is black.42
3. Incomplete Police Investigation
Additionally, evidence that pointed to suspects other than Mr. Coakley was
not pursued by the police. For example, Olga Delgado testified that she remem-
bered the stranger's adjusting the rearview mirror of her car as he drove her
home. When the car was recovered, the police carefully dusted it for prints. A
palm print was lifted from the rear view mirror. The police never compared this
print with Mr. Coakley's palm, and elimination prints were never obtained. After
Mr. Coakley's conviction, post-conviction counsel compared the palm print to
Ms. Coakley as well as to the usual drivers of the car, Ms. Delgado and Mr. Var-
gas. The prints matched none of these people.
41. Eventually, the lawsuit against the motel was settled for over $100,000. (Conversation
with Allen Zaroff, Esq., counsel for Olga Delgado and Gabriel Vargas, Oct 14, 1998).
42. Studies show that eyewitnesses are more likely to correctly identify a person from their
own racial background. This is known as the "own-race" phenomenon. In fact, "false-positives"
(the positive identification of the wrong individual) occur nearly 30 percent more frequently in
cross-racial identifications than in intra-racial identification. Additionally, false-positive identifi-
cations are even more likely to result when a white subject attempts to identify a black individ-
ual. The "own-race" phenomenon has been attributed to a number of factors: including the
belief by the identifiers that minority group members really do "all look alike"; the fact that
white identifiers are more likely to attribute guilt to persons of a different race; and the fact that
white identifiers expect to identify a black person. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross Racial Identification
Errors in Criminal Cases, 69 Cornell L Rev 934 (1984).
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4. The Expert Witness Waffles
Finally, the jury never heard the most persuasive evidence of Marion Coaldey's
innocence. When Ms. Delgado was taken to the hospital after the rape, semen
was found on her underwear. Since Ms. Delgado denied having had sexual inter-
course with anyone else that day, only the rapist could have been the person
responsible for the presence of sperm. Prior to the trial, the defense secured a
court order compelling serological tests to compare blood type groupings from
Mr. Coakley with the groupings from the semen stains. Tests were conducted by
Dr. Robert Shaler, who was then the Director of Serology at the New York City
Medical Examiner's Office. The results of the comparison showed that Mr.
Coakley was a type A secretor and that only type B was present in the rape kit
sample. In a report prepared prior to trial, Dr. Shaler concluded that Mr. Coakley
"could not be the donor of the semen."43
Unfortunately for Mr. Coakley, before the trial was scheduled to commence,
Dr. Shaler decided that he was no longer completely certain that the tests con-
clusively excluded Mr. Coakley. Dr. Shaler worried that if Mr. Coakley were a
low-level secretor, he might secrete so little blood group substance into his se-
men as to render it undetectable. In an effort to be cautious, Dr. Shaler informed
that court, at a pre-trial hearing, that he wanted to perform additional tests to
determine the range of Mr. Coakley's secretion levels, particularly because, as of
that date, there were no scientific studies publishing variation in ranges of secre-
tion levels. The trial court ruled that no adjournment for additional tests would
be granted and precluded all serological evidence.
Post-conviction, additional serological tests were conducted on multiple se-
men samples from Mr. Coakley. These tests conclusively showed that Mr. Coak-
ley always secreted sufficient amounts of blood group A so that if he had been
the rapist, type A substance would have been present. Moreover, two studies
were published in the year following the trial which demonstrated that the varia-
tion in blood group substance secretion levels are relatively small. The additional
test coupled with the publication of the new scientific studies led Dr. Shaler to
conclude to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that Mr. Coakley could not
have been the donor of the semen. If the court had granted an adjournment for
the additional tests pre-trial, Marion Coakley might well have been acquitted. 4
43. Exclusion tests did not have to be conducted on Mr. Vargas because Ms. Delgado and
Mr. Vargas had not engaged in sexual intercourse prior to the attack.
44. Other non-evidentiary factors conspired to make it more difficult for Mr. Coakley to
establish his innocence. He is slightly mentally impaired and thus unable to express himself as
dearly as others. Also, he had been arrested before, and in New York State a defendant who
elects to testify on his own behalf can be cross-examined about a prior record, unless the trial
judge makes a pre-trial determination precluding the prosecutor from inquiring about it. Gener-
ally, trial judges limit questioning about the underlying nature of the charges, while permitting
prosecutors to ask an accused whether he has ever been convicted of any felony, People v Ber-
mude.Z, 414 NYS 2d 645 (Sup Ct NY Cty 1979). This compromise ruling normally dissuades
defendants from taking the stand. In any event Mr. Coaldey did not testify on his own behalf at
trial.
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C. TIlE INADEQUACY OF COMMON LAW TORT ACTIONS AND
CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION
Although innocent people can be convicted anywhere, only those convicted in
jurisdictions with an indemnification statute have a remedy at law for the harm
suffered. 45 Neither the common law torts of wrongful arrest nor malicious
prosecution, nor the Civil Rights Act of 187146 provide redress. A malpractice
lawsuit against defense counsel is an option only when there has been ineffective
assistance of counsel.
In order to establish a malicious prosecution, claimants must prove not simply
that they were arrested and prosecuted and that the proceeding was eventually
terminated in their favor, but also that there was no probable cause for their
arrest in the first place and that they were prosecuted with actual malice.4 7 To
establish false imprisonment, claimants must prove that they were knowingly and
intentionally confined against their will and without their consent, and that the
confinement was not otherwise privileged.48 Probable cause for an arrest vali-
dates the arrest and relieves the defendant of liability under either theory.4 9
The Federal Civil Rights Act which creates the statutory basis for federal ac-
tions against state and local police officers for the deprivation of civil rights is
equally unavailing. Actions for false arrest can be brought under § 1983, as a
violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, but once again, only if the
initial arrest was made without probable cause.50 Each of these traditional causes
of action is available only when a claimant can establish that the person or entity
responsible for the harm was negligent. In many-if not most-of the cases
where an innocent person was convicted no single person can be described as
having been negligent or at fault.
45. There are exceptions to every rule. Certainly some individuals who have been wrongly
convicted will be able to bring a lawsuit. Mark Bravo, for example, just received almost S4 mil-
lion for three years in prison. DNA tests in 1994 excluded him as the perpetrator and he was
able to win a civil rights lawsuit in California by convincing Judge Cooper of the Federal District
Court that the investigators with the State hospital who examined the rape victim had "deliber-
ately and with malice deprived Bravo of his civil rights," Thao Hua, Falsey Jailed O.C. Man Wins
$4 Million Suit, LA Times (4/20/98). A number of others may be indemnified through passage
of a "moral obligation bill" in their state congress. Both of these options will be discussed at
some length in the next few pages. For the vast majority neither remedy is available.
46. See 42 USC § 1983, et seq.
47. See Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451 (NY Ct App 1975), and generally W. Page
Keeton, et al, Prosser & Keeton on Torts, § 119 at 871 (5th ed 1984).
48. Broughton, 37 NY2d at 457.
49. In an action for malicious prosecution, plaintiff must plead and prove lack of probable
cause. In an action for false arrest, plaintiff need not allege lack of probable cause, but the de-
fendant may establish justification as a complete defense by showing that the arrest was based
on probable cause. Id at 456.
50. "A peace officer who arrests someone with probable cause is not liable for false arrest
simply because the innocence of the suspect is later proved." Pierson v Ray, 386 US 547, 555
(1967). See also Monroe vPape, 365 US 167 (1961).
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Were claimants able to sue in tort or under the civil rights acts, they would
face another legal barrier to recovery in the doctrine of immunity which protects
witnesses, police, the prosecution and the judiciary from legal liability for errors
committed in the prosecution of crime 51 Finally, state law statutes of limitation
would bar most tort and civil rights actions5 2 State tort claims accrue when a
plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the tortious conduct. Generally statutes
of limitation require claims to be filed within one to three years from that point.
In wrongful conviction cases, years in excess of statutory time can elapse be-
tween the time plaintiffs learn of the tortious conduct and their eventual exon-
eration.
1. Immunity of Victims and Witnesses for Inaccurate or
Mistaken Testimony
A person who is misidentified by a victim or a witness cannot recover dam-
ages from either. Complainants and witnesses are protected from liability by the
doctrine of immunity, unless the prosecution is baseless and the complaint is
made with malice.53 In Marion Coakley's case, it would have been impossible to
argue that the victim's complaint was made with malice. Apart from the hotel's
allegations in defense of the pending lawsuit (which may very well have been
hypothetical), there is no reason to doubt that Mrs. Delgado was raped and that
she and the witnesses were completely convinced of Marion Coakley's guilt. Mrs.
Delgado's credibility was supported by her cooperation with the police and the
prosecution, and her traumatic reaction, as evidenced by her later fear of black
men. There is no suggestion anywhere in the record of fabrication, even if the
witnesses had a subsequent financial interest in being "right."
2. Police Immunity from Civil Liability for Lawful Arrest
In hindsight the police investigation leading to Marion Coakley's arrest ap-
pears rudimentary and slipshod. For starters, the police might have compared
the palm print, lifted from the rear view mirror of the car, with Mr. Coakley's
hand print. Nonetheless, although the fact investigation would have been more
complete--and perhaps more accurate-had a print comparison been con-
ducted, an incomplete investigation is neither reversible error nor a harm which
can be remedied via a tort or civil rights lawsuit
Once police have probable cause to make an arrest, they have no duty to con-
tinue to investigate other evidence which might prove the innocence of the ac-
51. Witness immunity is discussed in section II; police immunity at C.2; prosecutorial immu-
nity at C.3; and the immunity of public defenders is discussed at C.4.
52- There is no federal statute of limitations under 42 USC § 1983. § 1983 provides that the
law of the state in which the federal court sits shall govern. See Wilson v Garda, 471 US 261, 276
(1985).
53. See, for example, Anthony v Baker, 955 F2d 1395 (10th Cir 1992); White v Frank, 855 F2d
956 (2d Cir 1988); Nardl v Stanberg, 377 NE 2d 975 (1978); Martine v City of Albany, 364 NE 2d
1304 (NY Ct App 1977).
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cused or which might point to another suspect.5 4 The law does not require law
enforcement to pursue every single piece of potential evidence, especially when
there is reason to believe that the evidence would add little to the quantum al-
ready available to the prosecutors.
The police officers investigated Mr. Coakley's case with the same degree of
care and precision, or lack thereof, brought to bear on the great majority of rou-
tine criminal investigations.55 Significantly, there was not one but three eyewit-
nesses who positively identified the accused as the perpetrator in identification
procedures sanctioned by the courts as reliable and non-suggestive 6 The identi-
fications alone provided probable cause to arrest, and sufficient evidence to in-
dict and hold the accused over for trial.57
54. "The obligation of local law enforcement officers is to conduct criminal investigations in
a manner that does not violate the constitutionally protected rights of the person under investi-
gation. Therefore, whether the officers conducted the investigation negligently is not a material
fact." Orsatti v New Jersey State Police, 71 F3d 480, 484 (3d Cir 1995). The police are not required
to interview a suspect's alibi witnesses after making an arrest supported by probable cause. See,
for example, Romero v Fay, 45 F3d 1472 (10th Cir 1995). Once police officers have discovered
sufficient facts to establish probable cause, they have no constitutional obligation to conduct
any further investigation in the hopes of uncovering potentially exculpatory evidence. See, for
example, Schertz v Wanpaca County, 875 F2d 578, 583 (7th Cir 1998). Nor do the police have an
"affirmative obligation to seek out exculpatory information of which the officer is not aware."
Kelly v Curtis, 21 F3d 1544, 1551 (11th Cir 1994). "[H]aving once determined that there is prob-
able cause to arrest, an officer should not be required to reassess his probable cause conclusion
at every turn, whether faced with the discovery of some new evidence or a suspect's self-
exonerating explanation from the back of the squad car." Thompson v Olson, 798 F2d 552, 556
(1st Cir. 1986).
55. See generally, Stanley Z. Fisher, Just the Facts Ma'am: Lying and the Omission of Excieoatou
Evidence in Police Reports, 28 New Eng L Rev 1 (1993).
56. Showing photographs of possible suspects to crime victims is a time-honored police
procedure sanctioned by the courts. A criminal defendant has only the due process right not to
be the object of unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures, whether those procedures
are photo arrays or other types of procedures. United States v Thai, 29 F3d 785, 807 (2d Cir
1994). See also Manson v Braithwaite, 432 US 98 (1977) (addressing the admissibility of pre-trial
identification based on showing of a single photograph); Jarrett v Headl9,, 802 F.2d 34,41 (2d Cir
1986) (holding that the array must not be so limited that the defendant is the only one to match
the witness's description of the perpetrator). United States v Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F2d 934, 974
(2d Cir 1990). However, in New York State, joint viewing of a line-up has been held to be im-
proper because the various witnesses may suggest to each other that their choices are more or
less correct, although the impropriety is not always reversible error. See, for example, People v
GonZale: , 536 NYS 2d 297 (NY App Div 4th Dept 1988) and People v Fernandez, 440 NYS 2d 677
(NY App Div 2d Dept 1981). But see People v Byrd, 583 NYS 2d 849 (NY App Div 2d Dept
1992) (holding that the complainants' joint viewing of a stack of photos, with the defendant's
picture on top, was not unduly suggestive).
57. The Supreme Court has defined probable cause as: "facts and circumstances sufficient to
warrant a prudent man in believing that the (suspect) had committed or was committing an
offense," Gerstein v Pugh, 420 US 103, 111 (1975)dting Beck v Ohio, 379 US 89, 91 (1964). Police
officers may presume that the citizen making the accusation is reliable. An identification by an
eyewitness of an accused as the perpetrator of a crime constitutes probable cause. See, for ex-
ample, People v McCain, 543 NYS 2d 438 (NY App Div 1st Dept 1989); People v Peterkin, 521
NYS 2d 517 (NY App Div 2d Dept 1987).
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Finally, since probable cause determinations are often quite difficult, and be-
cause the courts believe that law enforcement officials should be liable only
where their conduct is dearly proscribed, courts conclude that the police are
protected from suit for their official actions by the doctrine of qualified immu-
nity even where there is only arguable probable cause.58
3. Prosecutorial Immunity for Failure to
Disclose Information
The prosecutors who presented the case against Marion Coakley possessed
evidence in their files that they failed to disclose to the defense prior to trial. The
defense was never informed about the $10 million lawsuit the complainant
brought against the motel. Had defense counsel known about the suit, he might
have argued to the jury that the crime never occurred, as the motel claimed in
defense of the suit, or he might have contended that the victim and eyewitnesses
were-at a minimum-reluctant to admit doubts about the certainly of their
identification because doubts could have adversely affected their chance to re-
cover money damages. Moreover, the prosecutors never told the defense about
the complainant's psychiatric care, depriving the defense of the opportunity to
discuss with the jury whether the complainant's mental and emotional state af-
fected her credibility as a witness. Most importantly perhaps, the defense never
heard that after the crime the complainant thought that all the African-American
men she saw on the street were the rapist.
Prosecutors are both legally and ethically obligated to reveal exculpatory evi-
dence to the defense,5 9 and at least one appellate level court in New York has
held that, where a complainant's lack of a motive to lie is a central issue, the
prosecution's failure to disclose the existence of a complainant's multi-million
dollar lawsuit against the defendant is a violation of Brady requiring reversal of
the conviction. 60 Thus, if the Coaldey case had been reviewed on direct appeal,
the conviction might have been reversed.61 On the other hand, whether or not
58. "Qualified immunity gives ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Hunter v Bryant, 502 US 224, 229
(1991). That is not to say that the police may not be sued for pressuring witnesses to fabricate or
confabulate testimony, or to make a false identification, or for deliberately withholding exculpa-
tory evidence. See, for example, Snyder v City of Alexandia, 870 F Supp 672 (E D Va 1994);
Goodwin v Melts, 855 F2d 157, 163 (4th Cir 1989). Compare Briscoe v LaHue, 460 US 325 (1983)
(holding that police officers who testify falsely and even maliciously at trial may not later be
sued under 42 USC S 1983 for damage caused by testimony) witb Maley v Brigs, 475 US 335
(1986) (holding that when a police officer functions as a complaining witness, he is not immune
from suit, under the common law or § 1983 if the prosecution was baseless); and Wite v Frank,
855 F2d 956 (2d Cir 1988) (holding that police officers who initiated a baseless prosecution
would be liable to the victim).
59. See, for example, Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 (1963) and United States v Bagley, 473 US
667 (1985). See also ABA Standards for CrimJust § 3-3.11(a) (3d ed 1993).
60. People v Wallert, 469 NYS 2d 722 (NY App Div 1st Dept 1983).
61. Because Mr. Coadey's conviction was set aside on a collateral motion for a new trial and
not on direct appeal, the appellate courts were never asked to determine whether the prosecu-
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the error would have triggered a reversal, the prosecutor's conduct is protected
by the doctrine of absolute immunity. A prosecutor acting within the scope of
his duties as an advocate "in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution" is
not amenable to suit.62 The Supreme Court extends absolute immunity to prose-
cutors acting in the exercise of their discretion in order to protect the prosecutor
"from harassing litigation that would divert his time and attention from his offi-
cial duties" and in order to enable "him to exercise independent judgment when
deciding which suit to bring and in conducting them in court."63
4. Difficulty of Establishing Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and
Potential Immunity for Defense Counsel
Marion Coakley might have considered bringing a malpractice suit against his
defense attorney on the theory that counsel was negligent in failing to learn of
Dr. Shaler's uncertainty, regarding Mr. Coakley's secretion levels, sufficiently far
enough in advance of trial to permit the additional necessary testing to be ac-
complished prior to the trial date. It is doubtful that such a suit would have been
successful, however, because Mr. Coakley would have had difficulty establishing
that his attorney failed to meet the requisite standard of care.64
In malpractice suits against criminal lawyers, negligence is treated as the
equivalent of ineffectiveness. 65 Ineffectiveness has been defined by the Supreme
Court as prejudicially deficient-a remarkably low standard. 6 In Strickland,
where the defendant complained that his counsel failed to seek out character
witnesses and neglected to request a psychiatric examination or to prepare a pre-
sentence report, the Supreme Court found no ineffectiveness holding the defen-
dant failed to establish either unreasonably deficient performance or prejudice.
In Mr. Coakley's case, defense counsel's preparation and performance would
probably not have been considered unreasonably deficient. In fact, counsel's
tion's failure to reveal this information was reversible error. Post-conviction counsel learned of
the lawsuit by interviewing the victim. The information was brought to the attention of the
court by way of motion to set aside the verdict.
62. Imbler v Pachtman, 424 US 409, 410, (1976). See generally, Kalina v Fletcher, 522 US 118
(1997).
63. Kalina at 506, citing Imbler v Pachtman, 424 US 409.
64. In order to bring a successful malpractice claim, a plaintiff must establish: 1) the exis-
tence of the attorney-client relationship; 2) the attorney's duty to act according to a particular
standard of case; 3) the attorney's failure to meet the standard; and 4) that some damage was
done as a result of the failure. See W. Page Keeton, et al, Prosser & Keeton on the Law of
Torts, § 30 at 164-165 (5th ed 1984). See also Shaw v State, 861 P 2d 566, 569 n2 (Alaska 1993);
Schulman v Terrence J. OHagen, P.C., 433 NW 2d 839, 846 (Ct App Mich 1988); Krahn v Kinney,
538 NE 2d 1058, 1061 (Ohio 1989).
65. "Even though 'the issue in ineffectiveness cases is not a lawyer's culpability, but rather
his client's constitutional rights," United States v Decoster, 487 F2d 1197, 1202 n21 (DC Cir 1973),
a court determination ordering reversal on ineffectiveness is some reflection that the trial coun-
sel failed to use the skill, diligence and degree of care that would have been exercised by a rea-
sonably competent attorney in similar circumstances. See generally, Richard Klein, LegalMa orac-
tice, Professional Disapline and Representation of the Indigent Defendant, 61 Temp L Rev 1171 (1988).
66. Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668 (1984).
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preparation was better than the average representation afforded to indigent cli-
ents across the country by underfunded and overworked defense counsel67 Mr.
Coaldey's counsel found, interviewed, and examined at trial eight alibi witnesses.
Counsel arranged for his client to take a polygraph test and informed the court
of the positive results. He found an expert and managed to have the necessary
serological comparison tests completed. He asked the judge for an adjournment
so that his expert could testify. His preparation can hardly be characterized as
"prejudicially deficient."
Furthermore, even if Mr. Coakley was able to establish the requisite breach of
a standard of care, he would once again have been blocked by the doctrine of
immunity. Traditionally, courts have not afforded court-appointed or public
defenders immunity protection, since they perform essentially the same role as
do privately retained counsel who certainly are not protected from suit 68 How-
ever, there has been some movement in the state courts to grant court appointed
or assigned counsel some measure of immunity in recognition of the difficulties
of public defender practice.69 Although many commentators deplore any trend
toward immunity, as a further abridgement of the rights of the accused,70 at least
six states have seen fit to protect the public defender from suit for negligence
arising out of the course of professional responsibilities71 In New York the only
case law on point is a 1978 decision by a trial level Supreme Court Justice hold-
ing that public defenders are immune from civil liability for judgmental or discre-
tionary acts.T2 In the absence of higher authority to the contrary it is not unrea-
sonable to conclude that Mr. Coakley's suit against his public defender would
have been dismissed.
Marion Coakley's prosecution and trial illustrate how easily innocent people
can be convicted despite representation by counsel-even counsel who bothered
to investigate the facts and prepare a defense. The outcome-determinative errors
67. Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and Arbitray Death
Sentences, 43 Buff L Rev 329 (1995) and Richard Klien, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The
Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 Hast Const L Q 625
(1986).
68. See Spring v Constantino, 362 A.2.d 871 (Sup Ct Conn 1975); Reese v Danforth, 406 A 2d 735
(Sup Ct Pa 1979). See also Harold Chen, Note, Maoraetice Immunity: An Illegitimate and Ineffective
Response to the Indgent-Defense Crs, 45 Duke LJ 783, 792 (1996).
69. See generally, Vick, PoorhouseJustice (cited in note 68).
70. See generally, Chen, Note, 45 Duke L J 783, 792 (1996); David Sadoff, Note, The Public
Defender as Private Offender:. A Retreat from Evolving Maoractice liabl'ity Standards for Public Defenders,
32 Am Crim L Rev 883 (Spring 1995); David J. Richards, Note, The Public Defender Defendant: A
ModelStatuto y Approach to PubicDefenderMaoraetice liabifity, 29 Val U L Rev 511 (Fall 1994).
71. Nevada: Morgano v Smith, 879 P 2d 735 (Nev 1994)and Ramirez v Harris, 773 P.2d 343
(Nev 1989); Delaware: Vick v Haler, 512 A 2d 249, 252 (Sup Ct Del 1986) affid, 514 A 2d 782
(Del 1987)and Browne v Robb, 583 A 2d 949 (Del 1990); Vermont Bradshaw vJoseph, 666 A 2d
1175, 1176 (Sup Ct Vt 1995); New Mexico: Herrera v Sedillo, 740 P 2d 1190 (NM Ct App 1987);
and Coyazo v State, 897 P.2d 234 (NM Ct App 1995); Minnesota: Djubak vMott, 503 NW 2d 771
(Minn 1993). In Pennsylvania public defenders are now only liable for conduct exhibiting reck-
less or wonton disregard of the defendant's interest not for mere negligence. See Baily v Tucker,
621 A 2d 108 (Pa 1993).
72. Scott vNiagra Falls, 407 NYS 2d 103 (NY Sup Ct 1978).
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were multiple, routine, non-purposeful, non-negligent, and, importantly, invisible
during the investigation and trial stages. Not until proof of innocence was ob-
tained post-conviction did the errors become clear.73 Moreover, the errors in the
Coakley case were errors of fact, once again illustrating that improvements in
criminal procedure laws will at best reduce the frequency of wrongful convic-
tions, but not eliminate them altogether.74 Innocent people will continue to be
convicted.
In the typical wrongful conviction case, the existence of probable cause for an
arrest, the various immunity doctrines, the time between the errors leading to
conviction and eventual release, and the difficulty of establishing ineffective as-
sistance of counsel present insurmountable barriers to a civil lawsuit for dam-
ages. On a practical level lawsuits can be expensive-prohibitively so for plain-
tiffs who have just been released from prison-and deadly slow.
Fortunately, Mr. Coakley was convicted in New York, where there is an in-
demnification statute.75 After the conviction was set aside and the indictment
dismissed, Mr. Coakley brought a successful claim for indemnification.7 6 If he
had been convicted in the thirty-six states without such a statute, he would have
had to find satisfaction in his freedom alone.77
III. THE JUSTIFICATION FOR INDEMNIFICATION LEGISLATION
Thus far, this article has presented evidence that innocent people have been,
and will continue to be, unjustly convicted, as an unfortunate but inevitable con-
sequence of the routine operation of the criminal justice system, and has demon-
strated that neither traditional fault-based tort actions nor civil rights statutes
provide a remedy.
Assuming that the failure to indemnify those who have been wrongly con-
victed is a problem worthy of solving, the next logical step would be to propose
and discuss solutions. But before turning to a discussion of remedies, it is neces-
sary to consider the assumption: to assess whether the absence of a financial
remedy is a problem which society has a responsibility to solve.
Clearly, states have no obligation, enforceable in law, to indemnify.78 In the
absence of a legal obligation, some will no doubt assert that society should be
73. It is also completely possible for an innocent person to be convicted in an error-free trial.
Any time a victim or a witness sincerely-but incorrectly-misidentifies someone as the perpe-
trator of a crime, a miscarriage of justice can occur.
74. See Radelet, In Spite of Innocence at 287 (cited in note 4).
75. NY Court of Claims Act § 8-b, discussed in section IV.
76. Coakg, 571 NYS 2d 867 (cited in note 36).
77. He might have had a political option, if he could have convinced the state legislature to
enact a special bill for his benefit-an extraordinary measure infrequently used and discussed in
Part III of this article.
78. Edwin Borchard wrote a series of law review articles attempting to describe a legal obli-
gation to indemnify the wrongly convicted. Ultimately, however, his attempts to discover a legal
obligation in the concept of eminent domain or through an analogy to compulsory jury or mili-
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absolved from responsibility to the wrongly convicted, pointing out that society
does not attempt make whole every person who has suffered an injury. Certain
harms are simply accepted as part of life.
On the other hand, to others it will seem unquestionably fair, just, and hu-
mane to indemnify those who have been imprisoned for crimes they did not
commit. But describing a desired outcome in positive terms is hardly the same as
articulating a rationale compelling it. Although society is in a better position to
bear the cost of the injury than is the person who has been wrongly convicted,
that observation can be made any time a non-negligent accident occurs.
What distinguishes the situation of the wrongly convicted from that of others
who have been accidentally injured is the state's involvement After all, it is the
state, through operation of one of its most essential services-the criminal jus-
tice system-that has inflicted the harm. Although it may be impossible to hold
any individual law enforcement officer, or any particular municipality, liable, the
state's responsibility for the injury is sufficient to generate a moral obligation.
Moreover, if neither compassion nor government complicity are sufficient moti-
vation, an additional argument compels creation of a remedy. We already com-
pensate some unjustly convicted people by statute in a few states and by indi-
vidualized legislation in some others. Basic fairness requires compensation for all
if there is compensation for some.
A. MORAL OBLIGATION BILLS
Moral obligation bills are specially drafted acts generally used to pay otherwise
unenforceable claims on behalf of individuals harmed by the state. The moral
obligation of the state to pay for "injury caused by [an] act of the state,. . . or
arising in the course of service to the state," has long been recognized in many
jurisdictions.79 "The state, as well as an individual, may be honorable and may
voluntarily recognize just obligations which it fairly and honestly ought to pay,
even though they do not constitute purely legal claims [that could be] enforced
under compulsion of judgment and execution."8 0 '"t is generally recognized that
a moral obligation is more than a mere desire to do charity or to appropriate
money in acknowledgment of gratitude. It is an obligation which, though lacking
any foundation cognizable in law, springs from a sense of justice and equity, that
an honorable person would entertain, but not from a mere sense of doing be-
nevolence or charity."81 Moral obligation bills have served a variety of purposes:
From indemnifying a private construction company for work done and debt
tary service proved unpersuasive. The citations to his series are collected in King, 118 U Pa L
Rev 1091, 1092 n13 (1970).
79. See, for example, 4usabe Chasm Co. v State, 194 NE 843, 845 (1935); Dickinson v Bradlg,
298 So 2d 352, (Fla 1974); Opinion of the justices to the Senate, 238 NE 2d 855 (Mass 1968); Austin
W. Jones Co. v State, 119 A 577 (Me 1923); Koike v Board of Water Spp/y, Cit and County of Hono-
httu, 352 P 2d 835 (Hawaii 1960).
80. Wihamsburgh Savings Bank of Brooklyn v State, 153 NE 58, 60 (Ct App NY 1926).
81. Hawaii Koike v Board of Water Supply, at 105-106 (cited in note 80).
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incurred at the state's behest,8 z to compensating the wife of a sheriff killed by a
man in his custody, 3 to compensating a child severely injured while in the State's
custody,84 to indemnifying individuals wrongly convicted. Were "moral obliga-
ion" bills universally available and uniformly applied, there would be no need to
pass general indemnification legislation. That is not the case.
Ultimately, the private bill remedy is an inadequate solution for individuals
who have been wrongfully convicted. First of all, some states interpret their con-
stitutions to forbid the use of such legislative acts, eliminating the bill as an op-
tion.85 Secondly, the success of any such private bill depends more on the politi-
cal connections of the person introducing the bill and the political climate of the
day than on the merits of the case. Third, the process can be lengthy and the
outcome is always uncertain.
In Virginia, a jury deliberated for only two hours before convicting Edward
Honaker of sexual assault, sodomy and rape. Sentenced to life in prison, Mr.
Honaker served ten years of his sentence before he was granted a pardon by the
Governor of Virginia. The investigation and trial record reveal a multitude of
mistakes which parallel those made in the Coakley case.86 Failure of the police to
thoroughly investigate, a heartfelt but incorrect identification by the victim, and
non-disclosure of exculpatory evidence affecting the credibility of the victim's
testimony8 7 all combined to miscarry justice. As in the Coakley case, serological
evidence conclusively established innocence post-conviction.
82. Williamsburgh Savings, 153 NE 58 (1926) (cited in note 80).
83. Gross v Gates, 194 A 465 (Vt 1937).
84. In re Guardianship of Gamble v Wells, 436 So 2d 173 (Fla App 2d Dist 1983).
85. Many state constitutions forbid the payment of private claims from public funds, or the
creation of private laws where general laws could be enacted, which would effectively prohibit
the use of a private bill to indemnify the wrongly convicted. See for example, Ore Const Art III,
§ 24. For states which interpret their constitutions to prohibit special bills, see, for example,
Rector v State, 495 P 2d 826 (Okla 1972) (Oklahoma); Mahwab and People v Bergen Counf Bd of
Taxation, 486 A 2d 818 (1985); and Fred P. Adams v Harris County, 530 SW 2d 606 (Tex Civ App
14th Dist 1975), appeal dismissed 429 US 803 (1976) (Texas).
86. See NIJ Report, (cited in note 6).
87. After the conviction it was discovered that the victim and her boyfriend had been se-
cretly hypnotized to enhance their memory. Apparently the victim had initially admitted to not
clearly seeing her attacker during the incident. Her recollection improved, allegedly, after hypno-
sis. Courts have struggled over the question of whether, and under what circumstances, to admit
testimony that has been hypnotically refreshed, because hypnotism has been shown to undercut
the reliability of eyewitness testimony. Apparently hypnotism puts a subject into a state of
heightened suggestibility which may cause the inaccurate recall of facts in order to please the
hypnotist. See generally, Jack Fox & Julian Fox, ReciprocalHypnosis, A New Standard for Admission
of Post-Hypnotic Testimony, 20 Pace L J 815 (1989). Individuals who have been hypnotized may
confabulate, may be unable to differentiate between accurate and inaccurate memories, and may
be overly confident about the accuracy of their memories. As a result of these concerns, state
and federal courts have adopted a variety of approaches to the admissibility of such testimony.
All courts, however, insist that the party against whom the hypnotically refreshed testimony is
being introduced be notified of the procedure so that arguments against admissibility can by
constructed and so that the witness's credibility can be tested through cross-examination, even if
the testimony is admitted. The Supreme Court has held only that a per se rule which prohibits a
defendant from testifying on his own behalf when his memory has been refreshed through
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Virginia's governor pardoned Edward Honaker on October 21, 1994, after he
had served ten years of his sentence.88 Because Virginia has no indemnification
statute, the only way Mr. Honaker could secure compensation was by convincing
the state legislature to pass a private bill authorizing an award to be paid from
state funds. Fortunately, Mr. Honaker was able to interest an attorney--an old
schqol friend of a state legislator-who was willing to draft legislation on his
behalf and to lobby extensively for its passage.9
Virginia is a bicameral state, which means we had to lobby for the Bill both in
the House and in the Senate. It was assigned to a Claims Committee and in all
we made at least four appearances before the Legislature. There was opposition
and we had to explain the merits of the case and why we came up with the
monetary request we did. It was almost like arguing the case before a jury, only
here it was a blue ribbon panel composed of many lawyers. There were conser-
vative legislators who were guarding the money as if it were their own. A cer-
tain number of them also felt that all people charged with crime are guilty, re-
gardless of what the truth is.9
Eventually, the bill appropriated $500,000 for Edward Honaker. Without Mr.
Honaker's well-connected advocate, no bill would have passed and no money
would have been forthcoming. Had Mr. Coakley been convicted in Virginia, he
might not have fared so well.
In addition to their essentially political character, private bills can work their
way very slowly through the political process. In Florida, it took more than
twenty years for two men, who were wrongly convicted of murder and sentenced
to death, to receive compensation from the state. Freddie Pitts and Wilbert Lee
were pardoned by the governor in 1975 after two trials and nine years on death
row.91 They finally won an award May 1998.92
Further, the private bill process is susceptible to manipulation by the unscru-
pulous since the decision to vote an award is based upon politicians' speeches
made on the floor of the congress, not upon sworn testimony subject to cross
examination at a fact-finding hearing. Pennsylvania's recent experience serves as
a warning.
In 1995, Pennsylvania's State Senate approved legislation awarding $325,000
in compensation to Mr. Hayden Jones, who was convicted in 1949 on what he
convinced the state senators were false charges of child molestation. Mr. Jones,
hypnotism is an unconstitutional infringement on the right of a defendant to testify and present
evidence in his own behalf. Rock vArkansas, 483 US 44 (1987).
88. NIJ Report, at 59 (cited in note 6).
89. 1996 Va. Acts Assembly H 222 (enacted).
90. Letter from MurrayJanus, Esq. to the author (Aug 5, 1996) (on file with the author).
91. "Authorities in Port St. Joe arrested Pitts and Lee shortly after the 1963 murders of two
gas-station attendants because they had been involved in a ruckus over the attendants' refusal to
let them use a whites-only restroom." Lucy Morgan, After 22 Years Bill Passes on Claim of Ex-
Death Row Inmates, St. Petersburg Times, (5/1/98).
92. The original award of $500,000 each was reduced to $350,000 by an administrative judge.
Rosa Reed, State Compensation Falls Short for Pitts and Lee, Miami Times, (6/14/98), 1998 WL
113683995.
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at seventy-two was a sympathetic character. He had left prison in 1968, after
having spent nineteen years in jail-five in solitary confinement. He was poor,
not even qualifying for Social Security benefits since he had never been physi-
cally strong enough to work after his release from prison 3
On November 21, 1995, State Senator Robert Tomlinson gave an "impas-
sioned" speech and convinced the Senate to vote a bill for Jones. Jones died
before the award was confirmed in the House. However, his death turned out to
be fortuitous for the senators who were spared embarrassment when they stum-
bled upon a twenty-year-old investigation into Mr. Jones' past, conducted by
previous lawmakers who were considering a similar bill, casting doubt upon
Jones' claims of innocence.94 Ultimately, there is no guarantee that an innocent
person will benefit from a private bill and no guarantee that the person who
succeeds is truly innocent.
Finally a bill, once passed, must be signed into law by the governor and "gu-
bernatorial treatment of such legislation has never been consistent."9 5 Amounts
awarded depend more on the size of the state coffers at the time or the political
climate than on factors related to the suffering and loss of the daimant. The Law
Review Commission recommending the creation of the Unjust Conviction Stat-
ute in New York wrote:
The enactment of such legislation is simply an ad hoc approach which is not in
the best interests of the State, not only because it can fail to compensate the
truly aggrieved, but also because it can lead to charges of influence, political
power, etc., that create an appearance of impropriety and undermine the integ-
rity of the legislative process. 96
Although private bills are not the solution for the wrongly convicted, they
embody the rationale for the solution. If the state recognizes its obligation to one
wrongly convicted individual, it recognizes its obligation to all.
93. Julie L. Nash, Bucks Man Seek Recompense Decades After 'Sordid Injustice,' The Allentown
Morning Call, (8/27/95), 1995 WL 9604232.
94. Mario F. Cattabiani, Anatomy of a Hoax * Lawmakers, Media Believed Jones' Stog of a Family
Tragedy, Injustice and Science Fiction, The Allentown Morning Call, (5/4/97), 1997 WL 5695496.
95. "In New York, Governor Dewey and Governor Rockefeller would approve such bills
only if the facts were such that a pardon on the ground of innocence would be in order." See
Memorandum of Approval of Governor Dewey, L. 1946, ch 974 [claim of Caruso] Apr 9, 1946;
Memorandum of Disapproval of Governor Rockefeller, Assembly Bill § 720-A [claim of Zim-
merman] May 22, 1969). Governor Carey, on the other hand, did not adhere to such a strict
standard in approving such legislation (see Memorandum of Approval, L. 19881, ch 608 [claim
of Zimmerman], July 17, 1981)." New York Law Revision Commission, Report to the governor
on Redress for Innocent Persons Unjustly Convicted and Subsequently Imprisoned, 1984
McKinney's Session Laws of New York, at 2914 [Hereinafter Law Revision Commission]. New
York depended upon "moral obligation" bills prior to passage of the State's Unjust Conviction
Law in 1984. In the 37 years prior to the passage of indemnification legislation only 5 men
"benefitted from the enactment of a private bill in the State Legislature." The fact that one of
these men was particularly well known to the public undoubtedly helped to garner the requisite
votes in support of his claim. Law Revision Commission at 2914.
96. See Law Revision Commission, id at 2915.
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Other objections to indemnification legislation might be practical. State gov-
ernments could fear potential expense or the impact of a new category of cases
on the courts or even the effect of the remedy on the criminal justice system.
The best answer to those concerns lies in a study of existing statutes97 which
prove the fears to be unfounded, and in the experience with crime victims' com-
pensation statutes which were enacted to assist a similarly situated class of inno-
cent injured people.
B. CRIME VICTIMS' COMPENSATION
Crime Victims' Compensation statutes became law in all fifty states in the fifty
years between 1954 and 1992.98 The legislation was remarkably attractive to state
governments which rapidly endorsed the new provisions, untroubled by the ad-
ditional expense the statutes would cause, the necessity of establishing a new and
separate bureaucracy, or the lack of a "legal tight" justifying creation of the legis-
lation.99
Enacting victims' compensation statutes was one of the many achievements
attributable to the victims' rights movement1°° which has its roots in the work of
Margery Fry, an energetic and dedicated English magistrate 01 Ms. Fry was trou-
bled by what she saw as the peripheral role relegated to complainantsj1 2
Mrs. Fry's work had an enormous impact. 03 Within a few years of the publica-
tion of 'Justice for Victims" in 1957, New Zealand established a system to com-
pensate victims of crimes.104 Great Britain adopted its own version in 1964.105
97. The final section of this article, Section IV, examines existing statutes.
98. Dale G. Parent, et al, Compensating Crime Victims: A Summary of Polides and Practices, Office
of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, US Dept of Justice (1992).
99. The states were encouraged to enact the legislation by passage of the Victims of Crime
Act (VOCA), 42 USCA. §9 10601-10604, in 1994, providing federal grants to supplement state
funding of victim compensation programs.
100. The Federal Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, 18 USCA § 1512-1515,
§ 3579-3580 provides crime victims' restitution, the right to a statement at sentencing in federal
cases and victim and witness protection.
101. Ms. Fry lived from 1876-1958.
102. To rectify the imbalance, she initially proposed that complainants be paid restitution
from offenders. Restitution would have a therapeutic effect on both the offender and the com-
plainant, she claimed. But a few years later, she amended her approach to advocate for govern-
mental compensation realizing that, therapeutic effect or not, the typical offender would not
possess the financial means to make adequate reparations. Margery Fry, Justice for Victims, The
Observer (7/7/57), reprinted in 8 J Pub L 192 (1959), quoted and documented in Daniel McGillis
and Patricia Smith, Compensating Victims of Cime: An Analysis of American Programs, National Insti-
tute of Justice, US Dept of Justice (1983) at 3. Margery Fry's work is discussed generally in
Herbert Edelhertz & Gilbert Geis, Public Compensation to Victims of Crime (1974). [Hereinafter
Edelhertz and Gels].
103. Commentators report that the debate over whether or not to compensate victims is
strewn with references to her thoughts and ideas. Edelhertz and Gels, id.
104. Parent, et al, Compensating Victims of Crime, at 3 (cited in note 98).
105. Id at 4.
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The idea spread to America where Arthur J. Goldberg, a Supreme Court justice
popularized it in a 1964 law review article:
Whenever the government considers extending a needed service to those ac-
cused of crime, the question arises: but what about the victim? We should con-
front the problem of the victim directly; his burden is not alleviated by denying
necessary services to the accused. Many countries throughout the world, recog-
nizing that crime is a community problem, have designed systems for govern-
ment compensation of victims of crime. Serious consideration of this approach
is long overdue here. The victim of a robbery of an assault has been denied the
"protection" of the laws in a very real sense, and society should assume some
responsibility for making him whole.06
A Gallop poll, conducted the next year, proved that the general population
supported the basic idea of victim compensation 0 7 In response, California be-
came the first state to enact legislation to compensate victims of crimes.10 8
New York followed closely behind, motivated by newspaper reports of the
death of Mr. Arthur Collins, a good Samaritan, who had come to the aid of a
fellow subway rider and had been killed for his efforts. 0 9 The Collins killing took
place at a time when the country's apprehension about street crime, especially in
the cities, was increasing, and when little attention had been paid to the victims
of crime generally." 0
The Collins story galvanized public opinion in New York. The City Council
passed a good Samaritan law authorizing the Board of Estimate to make awards
to victims."' Governor Rockefeller appointed a three-person committee chaired
by Attorney General Louis L. Lefkowitz to study the subject. The Committee
106. Arthur J. Goldberg, Equa/iy and Governmental Action, NYU L Rev 39, 224 (Apr 1964),
quoted in Edelhertz and Geis, at 12 (cited in note 102).
107. Persons were asked, "Suppose an innocent person is killed by a criminal-do you think
the state should make financial provisions for the victim's family?" Sixty-two percent thought
that the state should make such provision, 29 percent did not, and 9 percent had no opinion.
See Edelhertz and Geis, at 13 (cited in note 103).
108. See Cal Penal Code § 679-679.04 (1998).
109. See Edelhertz and Geis, at 21 (cited in note 102).
110. As late as 1974, Edelhertz and Geis were writing that:
The fate of victims of crime remains an almost totally neglected area of study in
the United States and elsewhere. A nascent field of investigation, rather grace-
lessly dubbed 'victimology,' has rather recently come into existence, but victi-
mological studies have concentrated almost exclusively on the extent of in-
volvement of victims in their own undoing. Investigations of homicide deaths,
for instance, show that strikingly often those killed duplicate in significant ways
the background and patterns of life of those who kill them-both parties to the
homicide, offender and victim, are apt to have previous arrests for crimes of
violence, for instance, and both are likely to be intoxicated. Who becomes the
murderer and who the murdered under such circumstances, appears almost for-
tuitous. Studies of forcible rape have focused on the subtle and not so subtle in-
discretions of the victim in bringing about her downfall.
Edelhertz and Geis, at 14 (cited in note 103).
111. Idat22.
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held public hearings and drafted legislation which was soon enacted making New
York state the third in the nation to enact victims' compensation legislation" 2
Victims' compensation legislation was easy to enact even in the absence of a
legal duty or obligation. State legislatures carefully shied away from declaring that
victims of crimes have a right to compensation, characterizing the obligation as a
'moral responsibility' to assist crime victims' 3 Courts, too, have carefully inter-
preted victims' compensation statutes so as not to create a "right" to compensa-
tion 114
To overcome the difficulty presented by the absence of a cognizable "right" to
protection, early proponents of crime victims' legislation attempted to gain sup-
port for the legislation by trying to show that such statutes would be useful to
society as a whole. These advocates argued that such legislation helped reduce
crime by demonstrating even more dearly to criminals our moral repulsion at
their acts through our payments to victims and by promoting victim cooperation
with law enforcement agencies.
Such optimistic theories were completely unsupported by documentation. By
1962 studies revealed that states operating victim compensation programs did
not have higher violent crime-reporting rates 15
Some opponents of the legislation argued that victims should not be compen-
sated because they were responsible for their own victimization 6 Others ob-
112. NY Exec Law 5§ 620-635 (1966).
113. Florida's statute is representative. The Preamble reads:
The legislature recognizes that many innocent persons suffer personal injury or
death as a direct result of adult and juvenile criminal acts or in their efforts to
prevent crime or apprehend persons committing or attempting to commit adult
and juvenile crimes. Such persons or their dependant may thereby suffer disabili-
ties, incur financial hardships or become dependant upon public assistance. The
Legislature finds and determines that there is a need for government financial
assistance for such victims of adult and juvenile crime. Accordingly, it is the in-
tent of the Legislature that aid, care, and support be provided by the state, as a
matter of moral responsibility, for such victims of adult and juvenile crime.
Fla St Ann S 960.02 (1978); See also the preamble to New York's similar law at NY Exec Law
§ 620-635 (1966).
114. See, for example, White P Violent Crimes Compensation Board, 388 A 2d 206, 214 n3 (NJ
1978 (interior citations omitted):
Contrary to the suggestion made in the dissenting opinion, the State as sovereign
is not 'liable' for the payment of claims for victim compensation benefits in the
sense that term is normally used. As we have observed . . ., there is no 'right' to
victim compensation benefits. Moreover, under the sui generis scheme of the
Criminal Injuries Compensation Act, the Board is 'liable' for the payment of vic-
tim compensation benefits only to the extent of its funding by the Legislature;
there is no 'excess' liability on the part of the public treasury for valid claims
which cannot be paid because of insufficient funding.
See also GyZuec v Zweibel, 426 NYS 2d 616, 618 (NY App Div 4 Dept 1980).
115. Schultz, The Violated A Proposal to Compensate Viims of Violent Crime, 10 St Louis U L J
238, 241 (1965).
116. According to Edelhertz and Geis, who cite to the New York Meeting of the Governor's
Committee on the Compensation of Victims of Crime, held on Jan 14,1966 at 141, Gerhard 0.
W. Mueller, a Professor of Law at New York University School of Law, suggested that the pro-
posed legislation might promote crime by reducing a criminal's "inner hurdle" against victimiz-
ing someone by allowing him to rationalize that "nobody got hurt." Edelhertz and Geis at 29
n.33 (cited in note 102). Mueller analogized to crimes against property, in which robbers were
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jected because crime victims were not their first choice of worthy unfortunates.
In New York State one of the first speakers at the legislative hearings held to
discuss the proposed legislation was a former Assistant District Attorney, Rich-
ard Kuh. Mr. Kuh worried that payments to crime victims would quickly soar
and that the costs of managing a compensation program would be unmanage-
able. He believed that society could find better ways to spend the money-even
within the criminal justice system. He argued that the public ought to be spend-
ing on additional police and better methods of drug treatment and rehabilita-
tion.117
Neither of these arguments slowed passage of the legislation. Instead, the bills
were carefully drafted to respond to those concerns. Thus, many states require
means testing, a minimum loss, and cooperation with law enforcement in order
to obtain financial assistance. Additionally, all programs have laws or procedures
designed to exclude non-innocent victims from receiving compensation."8 Six-
teen states reported to the NIJ that they deny awards completely if claimants are
found to have engaged in contributory misconduct. More often, states reported
reducing awards in proportion to the extent of contributory misconduct" 9
Financial objections do not seem to have been a genuine obstacle. The most
recent survey of crime victims compensation programs conducted by the U. S.
Department of Justice reports that in their most recent year of operation, pro-
grams responding to the survey, paid over $125 million in benefits. Administra-
tive costs averaged about 16 percent of total costs.120
The success of the campaign for crime victims' compensation statutes teaches
many lessons for advocates of indemnification legislation for the unjustly con-
victed. First, the legislation does not need to be supported by a "legal" obliga-
tion, nor does it need to further a collateral criminal justice goal-like reducing
crime or encouraging better citizen/police relationships. 121 Crime victims' legisla-
tion wasn't enacted because crime victims had a legal right to compensation, or
even because it was useful. The legislation was enacted because it seemed mor-
ally right to a public scared of crime and frightened of being victimized.
Second, while cost projections should not deter passage of the legislation, any
indemnification system must include provisions to ensure that only the truly
reported to have considerably less reluctance to hold up finance companies and large insured
corporations than to rob private citizens. Mueller also stressed that the psychological relation-
ship between the criminal and his victim often is too close and intricate for a statute to dis-
criminate categorically between one and another. "The vast majority of homicides and rapes are
victim-precipitated," Mueller told the committee, adding that the homicide victim's role in
courting death could range from an outright dare to a subliminal invitation. Id at 29.
117. Id at 28.
118. See generally, Compensating Crime Victims, at 23 (cited in note 98).
119. A typical example of the non-innocent victim is the loser of a barroom fight, where both
individuals have been drinking, and where an investigator has difficulty ascertaining the primary
aggressor, id at 23.
120. Id at 36.
121. The existence of a remedy might have a deterrent effect on police or prosecutorial mis-
conduct, but the justification for the remedy does not depend on whether or not it effectively
deters.
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innocent recover. Finally, the legislation needs an advocate and a story. The
legislation will be more attractive if introduced in the context of a highly
publicized miscarriage of justice, so that the public can identify with the
individual who has been wrongfully accused.
Passage of indemnification legislation would create for all what already exists
for some--an accessible, reliable and swift remedy triggered by the status of the
claimant and the harm endured, rather than the negligence or wrongdoing of the
individuals, or munidpalities which inflicted the injury.
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF EXISTING INDEMNIFICATION STATUTES
Despite the need for indemnification legislation and the persistent call to enact
it, existing indemnification statutes are surprisingly underutilized. The reasons
are fairly obvious: Some statutes require an unjustly convicted person to first win
a full pardon on the grounds of innocence in order to bring a claim. Others limit
damage awards to such an extent that claim filing seems pointless.
With fifteen different statutes in existence-some for as long as fifty
years'22 --it is possible to compare the states' experience with indemnification
legislation and reach some conclusions about which formulas are the most suc-
cessful.
A. CLAIM FiLiNG REQu mEmENS (CoNm ONS PRECEDENT)
All indemnification statutes are designed to satisfy two conflicting purposes:
ensuring that the truly innocent are compensated while simultaneously limiting
the proliferation of non-meritorious claims. The challenge for lawmakers is to
write a statute that focuses on the assertion of innocence, eliminates from con-
sideration those judgments which were reversed or vacated on grounds having
little to do with innocence (such as the suppression on constitutional grounds of
potentially incriminating evidence, or the deprivation of the right to a speedy
trial), and limits the necessity for judicial reevaluation of evidence produced at
the trial or hearing.12 3
To balance these competing interests, indemnification legislation incorporates
pleading requirements to screen potential claims. All statutes require claimants,
for example, to establish in pleadings that they were convicted of a crime (gener-
ally that crime must have been a felony), and that they were sentenced and
122. The oldest statutes are California's (1941), Wisconsin's (1943), Illinois' (1945), and North
Carolina's (1947). See note 1.
123. This was the task that the Law Review Commission in New York set out for itself when
it considered indemnification legislation. Law Revision Commission, at 2928-2929 (cited in note
95).
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served time in prison as a result 2 4 In addition, every statute requires claimants
to set forth prima facie proof of innocence so that the court or administrative
body reviewing the claim can determine from the papers whether there is a like-
lihood of success. In some states that proof can only be a pardon on the ground
of innocence.
Other states permit claimants to show, for example, that charges were dis-
missed by the prosecuting authority for reasons consistent with innocence or
that the case was tried to an acquittal, after a reversal on grounds consistent with
innocence.
Experience shows that the pardon requirement can be an insurmountable bar-
rier to recovery for deserving claimants because executive clemency is entirely
discretionary. 25 No one has a right to a pardon. 26 A person may have been
completely exonerated and nonetheless unable to obtain a pardon. Eligibility for
a pardon does not guarantee delivery. In fact, the grant of a pardon depends
primarily on whether the governor thinks that the voting constituency will ap-
prove the decision. Some governors seem to take pride in refusing to grant par-
dons.127 Others will only grant pardons on certain grounds. 12 Thus, statutes
which require pardons are likely to be self-defeating. A pardon requirement will
prevent an undeserving person from obtaining an award but will do little to as-
sist one who is truly innocent but is unable to rally support with the governor.
A quick look at Illinois' experience with its indemnification statute proves
how political a pardon requirement can be. The Illinois statute-which requires a
pardon for innocence-was enacted in 1945.129 For fifty years, until 1995, there
were only two successful indemnification claims in the state, despite the occur-
rence of many wrongful convictions there. 130 In 1997 and 1998, however, the
124. In other words, individuals who have been wrongfully convicted, but were sentenced
only to probation or to some other sanction less serious than a prison term, do not have a cause
of action.
125. See, for example, Rich v Chamberlain, 62 NW 584 (Mich 1895); Montgomegy v Cleveland, 98
So 111 (Miss 1923); Exparte Horine, 148 P 825 (Okla Crim Ct 1915).
126. See, for example, Roberts v State of New York, 54 NE 678 (NY 1899).
127. In September 1997, Governor George W. Bush of Texas, who has denied more than 400
pardons recommended by the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles, likewise declined to grant a
pardon to a Houston man who spent 12 years in prison for a rape that DNA testing later indi-
cated he did not commit. Sam Howe Verhovek, Convicted Rapist Denied Pardon Despite DNA Test,
Austin American-Statesman, Sunday (9/14/97), 1997 WL 2839020. Gov. Bush finally relented
after a blitz of media stories. Mike Kelley, DNA Leads Governor To Pardon Austinite (11/21/97),
1997 WL 284 7366.
128. Governor James Thompson of Illinois refused to grant pardons on the ground of inno-
cence. Telephone Interview with Chad Fornoff, Counsel to the Illinois Court of Claims (Sept
11, 1998).
129. The Illinois statute was amended in 1997 to increase awards, but the pardon requirement
was not eliminated. See Ill Rev Stat ch 705 § 505/8.
130. NIJ, Report at 34-76 (cited in note 6). Five of the twenty-eight cases described in the NIJ
report, for example, were Illinois cases. For example, Ronnie Bullock was convicted of raping a
nine-year-old girl in Chicago in 1984. He was sentenced to serve 60 years in jail. He served 10'/2
years of his sentence before DNA testing established that he could not have been the perpetra-
tor. Rolando Cruz and Alejandro Hernandez were convicted, again in Chicago, of raping and
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political climate changed and seven men were indemnified using the Illinois stat-
ute. The explanation for the difference is, in part, a change in administration.
Governor James Thompson, who was voted out of office in 1990, refused to
pardon anyone for innocence. His successor, Jim Edgar, has taken a different
position and will grant pardons to the unjustly convicted.131
Even when pardons are obtainable, the requirement can have unanticipated
and arbitrary results. Willie Gilbert was convicted of murder in 1953 and sen-
tenced to serve ninety-nine years in Texas. The conviction was affirmed and Mr.
Gilbert filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The District Court granted
him relief and ordered a new trial. Fourteen years after the original trial, the
charges were dismissed for lack of evidence. Mr. Gilbert filed a claim for com-
pensation under the Texas indemnification statute but the court refused to grant
relief holding that the claimant had forfeited his chances at indemnification by
selecting to file a writ in federal court rather than appealing to the governor for a
pardon.132 Five years later, Arnold Ashford's claim for compensation in Texas
was likewise rejected. br. Ashford had been wrongly convicted of theft and sub-
sequently granted a full pardon by the Governor in 1997. The State of Texas
successfully argued that by the time the pardon was granted the criminal charges
had already been dismissed and "there was nothing to pardon."' 33
On the other hand, a few states have recognized the types of unjust results a
pardon requirement can produce. In 1996, for example, New Hampshire
amended its indemnification statute to eliminate the pardon requirement134
which, according to the New Hampshire Attorney General's office, had pre-
vented an otherwise worthy claimant from recovering.1 35
There is no justifiable reason to condition relief upon the acquisition of a par-
don. Careful drafting can accomplish the same goal-ensuring that only the in-
nocent recover. Ten jurisdictions have drafted legislation in which indemnifica-
tion does not depend upon a pardon. Of those, the District of Columbia, Ohio,
New Jersey and West Virginia permit claimants to prove either that they have
been pardoned or that their conviction was vacated, and the indictment either
killing a ten year-old girl. They each served 11 years before the charges against them were dis-
missed. Gary Dotson served 8 years for a rape that the complainant eventually admitted to
having fabricated to hide a sexual encounter with her boyfriend. Steve Linscott was convicted in
Cook County of a murder and sexual assault in 1980. He served 3 years and was free on bond
for an additional 7 before the charges were dropped as a result of DNA analysis. Id at 39-65
131. Telephone Interview with Chad Fomoff, Counsel to the Illinois Court of Claims (Sept
11, 1998). Part of the explanation for the recent increase in successful claims is the 1977
amendment increasing the potential award.
132. Gilbert v State of Texas, 437 SW 2d 444 (Tex 14th Dist Civ App 1969).
133. Ashford v State of Texas, 515 SW 2d 758, 759 (Tex-Waco Civ App 1974). (Texas also
claimed that Mr. Ashford did not spend any time in jail as a result of the wrongful conviction,
but that argument did not convince the appellate court to affirm the dismissal of Ashford's
claim.)
134. See NH Rev Stat Ann § 541-B:14.
135. Telephone Interview with Steven Judge, Esq., Assistant Attorney General for the State of
New Hampshire, (July 30, 1998).
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dismissed on a ground consistent with innocence or tried to an acquittal. 36 Iowa
permits a claimant to bring a claim if the conviction has been vacated, dismissed
or reversed for any reason so long as no further proceedings can or will be
held.137 Tennessee requires proof of "exoneration or unconditional pardon due
to innocence."'138 California permits proof of either a pardon or proof of inno-
cence.139 The Federal statute requires a pardon or a court issued "certificate of
innocence."' 140 Wisconsin's statute has no conditions precedent and asks simply
for proof of innocence.'4'
The New York statute 42 requires claimants to establish in pleadings that: The
conviction was reversed or vacated and that the accusatory instrument was dis-
missed; or if a new trial was ordered, they were either found not guilty or were
not retried and the accusatory instrument was dismissed. To ensure that the
charges were dismissed on a ground consistent with innocence, a claimant must
further establish that the reversal or vacation of the conviction, and the dismissal
of the accusatory instrument, were made on one or more specific Criminal Pro-
cedure Law grounds. 143 Finally, the statute asks claimants to establish in plead-
ings a substantial likelihood of prevailing at trial. In summary, it gives appropri-
ate deference to prior court decisions-rather than a prior executive determina-
tion-while ensuring litigation of only claims based on innocence.
Because the New York State statute has been tested more frequently than any
other, there is a wealth of judicial experience applying it. The decisions illustrate
that the New York Court of Claims has had no difficulty distinguishing-on the
pleadings-between those petitions appropriate for determination on the merits
and those which fail to state a claim.144 Although a pardon requirement would
136. See Appendix for complete information.
137. See Iowa Code Ann 663A.1 (1997).
138. See Tenn Code Ann 9-8-108(a)(7)(1955).
139. See Cal Penal Code § 4900-4906 (1941).
140. See 28 USC § 1495, 2513 (1948).
141. See Wis Stat 775.05 (1943).
142. See New York Court of Claims Act § 8-b.
143. Unfortunately, the statute does not include all of the possible grounds-consistent with
innocence-upon which a case in New York may be dismissed. New York has a catch-all clause
which permits a case to be dismissed "in furtherance of justice," NY Crim Proc Law § 210.40.
Although "in furtherance of justice" sounds consistent with innocence, since that clause wasn't
specifically included as a permissible ground in § 8-b, a claimant whose indictment is dismissed
for that reason will not be able to meet the conditions precedent for bringing a claim-even if
innocent.
144. See, for example, in Forest v State of New York, 541 NYS 2d 213 (NY App Div 1st Dept
1989), where claimant Forest had been convicted of several robberies. The conviction was re-
versed because the trial court erred in its charge and by permitting the introduction of certain
identification testimony. Subsequently the prosecutor declined to retry the case in deference to
the victims who did not wish to testify again and because, even were the claimant to have been
reconvicted, he would have already served any possible re-sentence. The Court of Claims had
no trouble determining that the claim did not meet the statutory pleading requirements. See
also, Fudger v State of New York, 520 NYS 2d 950 (NY App Div 3d Dept 1987), holding that a
claim based on a double jeopardy did not come within the scope of the indemnification statute;
Heiss v State of New York, 531 NYS 2d 320 (NY App Div 2d Dept 1988), where a claim was
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make the decision simpler, that slight advantage to the Court is far outweighed
by the arbitrary and political effect the pardon requirement has on potential
claimants.
Pardon requirements should be eliminated where they still exist New indem-
nification statutes should model their language on those statutes that provide an
alternative to requiring a grant of executive clemency. Careful drafting can easily
accomplish what a pardon requirement is intended to achieve, without adding
inappropriate and unnecessary barriers to recovery.
B. LIMITATIONS ON AWARDS
Many states severely and unnecessarily limit the amount of recoverable dam-
ages. The unreasonable limitations discourage claim filings. California, for exam-
ple, permits no award greater than $10,000,145 and despite evidence that thirty-
one individuals have been wrongly convicted in that state,146 it appears that only
one wrongly convicted individual has successfully used California's indemnifica-
tion statute.147
Wisconsin, which limits awards to $5,000 per year or $25,000 in total-
inclusive of costs, attorney fees and disbursements-reports that in the statute's
fifty-five year history there have been only two successful claims14s although
researchers have documented five wrongful convictions in that state.149 In West
Virginia, which limits awards to a maximum of $50,000, the Court of Claims has
made only two awards.150 Texas, the site of many unjust prosecutions and con-
dismissed because the claimant's conviction for selling narcotics had been reversed for errone-
ous evidentiary rulings and one of the undercover officer's had testified at the trial that the
claimant had been found with $2,500 in marked money at the time of his arrest-facts inconsis-
tent with innocence; Stewart v State of New York, 518 NYS 2d 648 (NY App Div 2d Dept 1987),
where charges were dismissed for prosecutorial misconduct but no proof of innocence was
contained in the pleadings; IJuveras v State of New York, 518 NYS 2d 548 (NY Ct Cl 1987), where
the claimant's conviction was reversed due to the admission in evidence of a coerced confes-
sion, but where no evidence of innocence was alleged; and Pough v State of New York, 582 NYS
2d 590 (NY Ct Cl 1992), where the claimant's charges were eventually dismissed because he had
served the maximum sentence that could have been imposed on him after a subsequent trial. In
the one case that reached New York's highest court, the Court of Appeals, while not spelling
out the facts in great detail, held that an acquittal after trial is not the equivalent of innocence
and that a claim can not proceed without additional proof of innocence, Reed v State oflew York,
574NE 2d 433 (NY CtApp 1991).
145. See Cal Penal Code % 4900-4906.
146. See In Spite of Innocence, at 359-360 (cited in note 4).
147. In 1967 Victor Ciancanelli received $5,000 for five years of imprisonment, Ciancanellia v
CalState Board of Control, 248 Cal App 2d 705 (Cal App 3d Dist 1967).
148. Memorandum from Patricia A. Reardon, Program Assistant at the State of Wisconsin
Claims Board (July 29, 1993) (on file with the author).
149. See In Spite of Innocence, at 359-360 (cited in note 4).
150. William C. Edens, Jr. v State of West Viginia, (CC-87-218, opinion issued Nov 23, 1988);
and Hary Lee Clyton v State of West Virginia (CC-89-235, opinion issued Oct 1989).
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viction but fewer exonerations, 15l reports that only a single claim has been paid
under its statute.152
States may have limited awards out of fear that the sheer number of claims
would strain state budgets. This concern is unfounded. The number of wrongful
convictions occurring in any state is simply not great enough to warrant these
restrictions. Once again New York's experience is useful. New York's indemnifi-
cation statute does not limit damages. Between January 1, 1994 and March 31,
1998, forty-seven wrongful conviction claims were filed with the Court of
Claims. The Court made an award in three cases. Six others were settled. The
remainder were dismissed. The total amount awarded to claimants was
$2,815,7501 3-an amount which appropriately corresponds to the expected
number of wrongful convictions in a heavily populated state with a large criminal
justice system, but which is hardly budget-breaking. 54
Although placing a dollar amount on the loss of liberty inevitably seems arbi-
trary, measuring damages in wrongful conviction cases has proved no more dif-
ficult in any other category of personal injury case. Freedom is valuable and its
loss can be measured, if imperfectly, and compensated.
The claimant has been humiliated, degraded, shamed and suffered a loss of
reputation and earnings. For this he must be paid, and for this money damages
can be compensatory. But all the wealth of the State of New York could not
compensate the claimant for the mental anguish suffered through nearly twelve
151. Only one of the 28 exonerations documented in the NIJ report occurred in Texas, al-
though many men have been unjustly convicted in that state. See, for example, Bob Herbert,
Editorial, The Wrong Man, NY Times (7/25/97) at A29, 1997 WL 17848288 recounting the story
of David Wayne Spence's execution on Apr 3, 1997 for a triple homicide of which he was "al-
most certainly innocent." See also In Spite of Innocence, at 359-360 (cited in note 4) (documenting
ten wrongful convictions in Texas, prior to the Spence case).
152. Texas caps at S50,000. Tex Code Ann § 103.001. In 1969 Mr. Vargas received an award
of S20,000 for physical and mental pain and suffering. Mr. Vargas had been sentenced to death.
His head was shaved; he was given his last meal; and he was shown the coffin in which he was
to be buried. Four hours before the scheduled electrocution, a stay was issued and he was sub-
sequently granted a full pardon. See State v Vargas, 424 SW 2d 416 (Tex 1968).
153. See report from the Chief Clerk of the New York Court of Claims (dated Apr 27, 1998)
(on file with the author).
154. The absence of adequate remedy at law for the unjustly convicted is especially incongru-
ous when contrasted with the relatively easy availability of recourse for individuals who have
been injured in other-and often much less serious ways-during the investigatory phase of the
criminal justice system. Police officers, and police departments, as well as the municipalities and
governments who employ and train them, are sued successfully and frequently for mistakes in
judgement, for negligent or reckless behavior, and for the use of excessive force. "A damages
remedy against the offending party is a vital component of any scheme for vindicating cherished
constitutional guarantees, and the importance of assuring its efficacy is only accentuated when
the wrongdoer is the institution that has been established to protect the very rights it has trans-
gressed . . ." Owen v CiGy of Independence, 445 US 622, 651-52 (1980). A verdict search in New
York State reveals that from 1992-1997 there were approximately sixty plaintiffs' verdicts (dis-
tinct from settlements) in suits against various state, city and local police forces for false arrest
and malicious prosecution alone. These awards, which do not include awards for assault or
other types of intentional police misconduct, totaled over S1 I million.
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years of false imprisonment, under the impression that he would be there for
the rest of his life. How can a man be repaid who has been branded a murderer
and whose only hope is an early death to release him from the sentence errone-
ously passed on him? For this, any award is bound to be a mere token, but it
should compensate as well as the medium allows. 55
In Robert McLaughlin v State of New York,156 the Court of Claims was required to
evaluate six and one-half years of a young man's life. In considering non-
pecuniary losses, the Court held:
At the outset, we find that claimant has undoubtedly suffered a loss of reputa-
tion. Although he had two minor scrapes with the law they are really of little
consequence when compare with a stigma of a murder conviction. Surely, peo-
ple will wonder? Surely, individuals will always question? Surely, the grief will
always be pain to see? It is fairly simple to award damages for physical injury.
The injury is visible, the likelihood of recovery predictable. Here, the injury is
not just a physical ailment, although there are elements that are. Here the Court
is called upon to determine the value of freedom as to this individual claimant.
In effect, we are asked to place ourselves within the experience of the claimant
in his enduring quest for freedom. ... How does one place a monetary value on
seemingly mundane things like sleeping in one's own bed; a stroll through a
park or a hug form a loved one. Yet, those are among the very things one longs
for, and which are denied to a person in prisonj 57
Ultimately, Justice Orlando awarded $1.5 million for the loss of liberty, mental
stress anguish and reputation.
Parsimonious monetary limits dissuade counsel from pursuing wrongful con-
viction claims on behalf of exonerated individuals, and discourage counsel from
assisting those who are still in prison and able to present a reasonable claim of
innocence which requires development s15 8 Having been convicted, most often by
a jury verdict then affirmed by appellate courts, wrongly convicted individuals
have understandable difficulty convincing anyone to look at their claims. The
possibility of an award might interest counsel to assist with the necessary investi-
gation.
For those who have been vindicated, indemnification claims are not condu-
cive to pro se litigation. Claimants need help drafting claims to withstand mo-
tions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Conditions precedent must be met
and plead in the moving papers and the likelihood of prevailing at a trial must be
established. Larger awards, and provision for attorney's fees, will not only ensure
155. Hoffner v State of New York, 142 NYS 2d 630 (NY Ct Cl 1955).
156. Court of Claims No. 75123 Decision filed Oct 16, 1989.
157. Id at 12-13.
158. The Innocence Project, which represents convicted people across the county, has a cur-
rent docket of 250 individuals whose cases have been screened and are in the midst of active
investigation. A thousand other cases have been preliminarily accepted but are not yet being
investigated. Every Innocence Project client has failed to interest other counsel in his case.
Meanwhile the Project has declined to help thousands of others who may be innocent but
whose claims can not be proven by serological comparison. (Conversation with Peter Neufeld,
co-director of the Innocence Project, Oct 11, 1998.)
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that the wrongly convicted are adequately and fairly compensated for their loss,
but will ensure that claimants can find counsel to assist them to pursue indemni-
fication.
C. BURDENS OF PROOF
In some states the existence of a pardon is sufficient to establish state liability.
In most, however, once pleading requirements have been met, claimants must
then prove innocence at a hearing-either by clear and convincing evidence or
by a preponderance of evidence. It might be expected that only DNA exclusion
cases could meet the clear and convincing standard, and that such a high stan-
dard would needlessly thwart meritorious claims. That has proved not to be true.
In New York, where proof must be proved by clear and convincing evidence,
Arthur Cleveland (to take just one example) was able to establish his innocence
of a murder simply by testifying that he had been in another state at the time of
the crime and by discrediting the credibility of the prosecution's alleged eyewit-
ness-whose testimony was the only evidence linking him to the crime-with
information about her character that had not been available to the defense at the
first trial.159 Ordinary testimony was sufficient to meet the burden. In fact, al-
though many claims (in New York and elsewhere) have been dismissed for fail-
ure to meet pleading requirements or to establish innocence, I have not found a
single case where that determination was affected by the burden of proof or
where the burden was even discussed as claim determinative.160 Thus, new in-
demnification statutes should consider incorporating the clear and convincing
standard since it neither deters claim filing nor impedes judges from making
awards, and may be reassuring to lawmakers and the general public.
D. ABSENCE OF BEHAVIOR CONTRIBUTING TO CONVICTION
The vast majority of states require claimants to affirmatively prove they did
nothing that might have contributed to their initial unjust conviction-such as
pleading guilty or testifying falsely at their trial. Although this requirement has
created some collateral litigation,161 it is both reasonable and practicable. 62 Stat-
159. Arthur Cleveland v State of New York, Court of Claims Claim No. 74204, decided Apr 22,
1992.
160. This may in part be due to the fact that claims against states are generally decided by
judges, not juries.
161. For example, in the Coakley appeal, noted above in Section II of this article, the New
York State Attorney General unsuccessfully argued (among other things) that because Mr.
Coakley's defense attorney failed to convince the court to admit the exculpatory serological
evidence, Mr. Coakley's claim was precluded due to ineffective assistance of counsel attributable
to the defendant.
162. In New York, claims have been disallowed where the claimant offered a false alibi at his
trial, Moses v State of New York, 523 NYS 2d 761 (NY Ct C1 1987); and where the claimant's
willingness to work with unlicensed handgun within reach contributed to conviction for illegal
possession, Alexandre v State of New York, NYLJ, at 24 (3/31/89), col. 1, affd on other grounds,
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utes should be carefully drafted, however, so as not to preclude a claimant, who
was coerced into falsely confessing or who entered an Alford plea,163 from filing
a claim.
E. FORUM OF ADJUDICATION
In New York a claim for unjust conviction is brought directly in the Court of
Claims. In other states, claims are routed through civil court In California, Mary-
land, and Wisconsin a claimant must file a petition before an administrative
board. In North Carolina, the Industrial Board makes an initial determination of
liability and then the claim is sent to the Court of Claims for a damage determi-
nation. For states considering the question, there will be an insufficient number
of cases filed in any year in any state to merit the creation of an administrative
board or agency to determine wrongfal conviction cases. Existing forums can
handle the additional matters expeditiously. Furthermore the legal issues arising
are neither so technical nor so unique as to justify creation of a specialized
agency.
F. Tm, LIMITS
All indemnification statutes have standard and reasonable two year statutes of
limitation, except for California which requires claims to be filed within six
months from the triggering event acquisition of a pardon, acquittal or dismissal
of the charges. Six months is too short.
G. RETROACTIVITY
Most indemnification statutes include a clause permitting all outstanding
claims in existence to be filed within a certain time from the operative date of the
statute.
H. CLAIM PRECLUSION
The New Jersey and New York wrongful conviction statutes include pream-
bles specifying that the creation of an indemnification remedy was intended to
563 N.Y.S. 2d 635, appeal dismissed 77 NY 2d 925, 569 NYS 2d 603, 572 NE 2d 44 (1991). The
Third Appellate Department, however, rejected the argument that the daimant's failure to tes-
tify at trial contributed to his conviction. See LanZa v State of New York, 515 NYS 2d 928 (NY
App Div 3d Dept 1987).
163. An Alford plea, which takes its name from North Carolina vAfford, 400 US 25 (1970), is a
plea of guilty in which accused does not admit guilt but offers to plead to avoid the possibility
of the much more severe sentence that would be imposed after trial. As mentioned earlier, the
NIJ report contains one case where an innocent man entered an Alford plea to avoid the death
penalty. See note 31.
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supplement not supplant already existing tort remedies. 164 Although this lan-
guage ought to be superfluous since acceptance of an indemnification award
should not bar subsequent lawsuits, especially when so many of the indemnifica-
tion awards drastically limit damages, it should be included in all new statutes.
Acceptance of an indemnification award should not be construed as a waiver or
release of the state from any further potential tort or civil rights claims. If such
suit were successful, the amount awarded as indemnification could be deducted
from damages so as to prevent a double recovery.
V. CONCLUSION
David Shepard was released from a New Jersey prison in April 1995, after
serving almost eleven years for a crime the courts now agree he did not commit.
At the time of his arrest, David Shepard was nineteen years old and the father of
a five-month-old baby boy. He had never been arrested before.
Like Mr. Coakley, Mr. Honaker, and many others, Mr. Shepard was misidenti-
fied by a rape victim. A jury believed the victim's testimony over Shepard's alibi
evidence. He was convicted and sent to prison. Mr. Shepard persistently pro-
fessed his innocence and "started reading prison library books about DNA evi-
dence. In 1992 he sought to have DNA evidence used to prove his inno-
cence. ' 165 Fortunately the original semen samples taken from the rape victim had
been preserved and post-conviction DNA testing established that he was not the
rapist. 166 A new trial was ordered on the basis of the DNA test results and even-
tually the prosecution declined to re-try the case.167
After his release, David Shepard explored the possibility of filing a lawsuit
seeking damages for the years he had spent in prison. He contacted Paul Cas-
teleiro, Esq., an attorney experienced in litigating damage claims on behalf of
individuals who had been maliciously prosecuted and unjustly arrested. 68 Mr.
Casteleiro analyzed the case from top to bottom and had bad news for Mr.
Shepard. There was no one to sue. Just as in Mr. Coakley's case, Mr. Shepard
was convicted because the victim was wrong. The police were justified in relying
on the identification. The prosecuting attorneys were required to indict, and the
jury was entitled to believe the victim and convict. The fact that they were all
wrong didn't establish anyone's liability under the law.
164. See NJ Stat Ann 52:4C-1 which reads "The legislature finds and declares that innocent
persons who have been convicted of crimes and subsequently imprisoned have been frustrated
in seeking legal redress and that such persons should have an available avenue of redress over
and above the existing remedies to seek compensation for damages." See also NY Ct Cl § 8-b.
165. Dana Coleman, Man Seeks State Compensation After 11 Years in Prison, New Jersey Lawyer
(12/4/95).
166. NIJ Report, at 70-71 (cited in note 6).
167. Id.
168. Telephone Interview with Attorney Paul Casteleiro, July 1997.
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For three years it looked as though Mr. Shepard would be unable to collect a
dime in compensation. Not only did New Jersey lack a wrongful conviction stat-
ute, but New Jersey state courts historically interpreted their state constitution as
prohibiting the passage of a special "moral obligation" bill.169
In response to the inequities in New Jersey's law, Mr. Casteleiro proceeded to
draft an indemnification statute so that Mr. Shepard and others like him would
not be left without recourse. He sent the draft to the office of every state legisla-
tor in New Jersey, along with a newspaper article describing Mr. Shepard's expe-
rience. The story convinced New Jersey State Senators Rice and Cardinale to
sponsor a bill which was signed into law by Governor Whitman during July of
1997.170 The entire process from bill drafting to the governor's signature took
only eighteen months. The law permits "mistakenly" convicted individuals to
collect $20,000 a year for each year spent in jail. 71
Mr. Casteleiro's success can be duplicated in each state without indemnifica-
tion legislation. Moreover, it is not necessary to wait until someone is wrongly
convicted. States can be persuaded to enact legislation prophylactically just as
victims' compensation statutes were eagerly enacted on the strength of a single
incident. All that is needed is a dedicated spokesperson or organization. There
are plenty of sympathetic stories to tell.172
While Borchard may have had difficulty convincing a skeptical public in 1932
to indemnify the wrongfully convicted, it was probably equally difficult to con-
vince the public, at that time, that completely innocent people were convicted.
Americans like to pretend that our criminal justice system, with its many proce-
dural safeguards for the accused, embodies the maxim that "it is far worse to
convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free."' 73 As late as 1988,
disbelieving critics disputed Radelet and Bedau's descriptions of miscarriages of
justice in homicide cases by challenging the facts and claiming bias and exaggera-
tion.174
169. "The Legislature shall not pass any private, special or local laws." NJ Const art IV, S 7,
para 9.
170. NJ Stat Ann § 52:4C-1 - 4C-6.
171. The law was enacted and entitled "New Jersey's Compensation for Persons Mistakenly
Imprisoned", NJ Stat Ann % 52:4C-1 - 4C-6 (effective Aug 25, 1997).
172. Ohio's indemnification statute, Ohio Rev Code Ann § 2305.02, 5 2743.48, was enacted in
direct response to Mr. Leonard ONeil's case. Mr. O'Neil was convicted of a robbery he did not
commit and spend three and one-half years in jail before someone else confessed to the crime
and he was released. The Ohio General Assembly enacted special legislation permitting his claim
against the state to proceed but the Court of Claims awarded him only $6,967. O'Neil appealed
and the Ohio Court of Appeals, at ONeilv State, 469 NE 2d 1010 (Ohio App 10 Dist 1984), set
aside the award as grossly inadequate. Two years later Ohio passed its indemnification statue-
which has been used successfully more than most. See generally, Cox v State, 552 NE 2d 970
(Ohio Ct 1988); Chandler v State, 641 NE 2d 1382 (Ohio App 8 Dist 1984); and Fy v State, 610
NE 2d 622 (Ohio Ct Cl 1988).
173. In re Winship, 397 US 358, at 372 (1970), collected in William S. Laufer, The Rhetoric of
Innocence, 70 Wash L Rev 329 (1995).
174. Markman and Cassell, 41 Stan L Rev 121 (cited in note 5).
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Today, advances in the forensic sciences prove to a moral certainty that de-
spite our highly technical rules, the adversary process, a multi-tiered appellate
process and publicly funded defense counsel, innocent people are convicted. We
can no longer seriously contend that the criminal justice system convicts only the
guilty or always lets the innocent go free. However unpleasant that knowledge
might be, it compels action.
As Borchard stated the case:
Whatever the most convincing theory, compensation responds to an elemen-
tary demand for justice harbored in every human breast. Just as that demand is
satisfied by the conviction of the guilty, so it required acquittal of the innocent.
When, then, by a misguided or mistaken operation of the governmental ma-
chine there is a miscarriage of justice and the helpless innocent is actually con-
victed, the public conscience is and ought to be revolted and dismayed. The
least the community can do to repair the irreparable is to appease the public
conscience by making such restitution as it can by indemnity. 75
175. See Conicting the Innocent, at 392 (cited in note 4).
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